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DISFAVORED CONSTITUTION, PASSIVE
VIRTUES? LINKING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
FISCAL LIMITATIONS AND PERMISSIVE
TAXPAYER STANDING DOCTRINES
Joshua G. Urquhart*
This Article contrasts the permissive state taxpayer standing doctrines in
place in most states with the restrictive federal and state taxpayer standing
rules applied in federal court. It proposes a new theory to explain this
disparity, arguing that ubiquitous state constitutional fiscal restrictions,
which specifically limit a state government’s ability to tax, spend, and
borrow, are a primary impetus in the creation and development of liberal
state taxpayer standing doctrines. The Article evaluates this novel
hypothesis through an empirical-historical survey of the early state
taxpayer standing decisions in every permissive jurisdiction and finds that
these provisions are indeed involved in most cases and in most states. It
concludes by discussing the implications of these results.
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INTRODUCTION
Texas Governor Oscar Branch Colquitt started submitting invoices to the
state comptroller for various sundry expenses in June 1914.1 They included
charges for gas, ice, telephones, automobile repairs, coal, waiter services,
eggs, bread, and other groceries.2 The state legislature appropriated funds
to pay the bills on February 11, 1915.3 Texas State Representative W.C.
Middleton filed a lawsuit against the Texas state comptroller, seeking to
enjoin the appropriation.4 He argued that it violated article IV, section 5 of
the Texas Constitution, which at the time limited the governor’s
compensation to an annual salary of $4,000.5 Middleton contended that the
appropriation caused the governor to exceed this cap, and thus it constituted
an unlawful expenditure of state taxpayer dollars.6
The trial court agreed. It issued a temporary injunction on June 12,
1915,7 barring the comptroller from paying bills submitted by a hotel, book
store, two grocers, a butcher, and two other creditors.8 These bills totaled
approximately $400 and included a $90 charge from the Driskill Hotel in
1. See Terrell v. Middleton, 187 S.W. 367, 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Martha Sue Parr, Chicken Salad Case, HANDBOOK TEX. ONLINE, http://www.
tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/jrc01 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
5. See TEX. CONST. art. 4, § 5 (1876).
6. See Terrell, 187 S.W. at 368.
7. See Parr, supra note 4.
8. Terrell, 187 S.W. at 368.
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Austin for fifteen gallons of chicken salad.9 The court entered a permanent
injunction after a bench trial, and the state comptroller appealed.10
The comptroller’s first argument on appeal effectively was that
Middleton lacked standing to pursue the state constitutional claims.11 He
contended that the “pleadings affirmatively show that [Middleton] has no
interest in the suit other than as a citizen and as a taxpayer in general with
other citizens and other taxpayers.”12 The appellate court rejected this
argument. It noted that Middleton was seeking to enjoin the illegal
expenditure of taxes collected by the state, a portion of which he paid
himself.13 The court compared such unlawful spending to the illegal
collection of taxes and opined that because both effectively increased the
tax burden, any affected taxpayer could challenge them.14 It proceeded to
the merits, holding that appropriations for fuel, water, lights, and ice were
necessary to maintain the governor’s mansion, but the groceries and other
personal expenses constituted excess compensation in violation of the
Texas Constitution.15 The court acknowledged that the antiquated
compensation limit was insufficient, but especially in light of previous
failed attempts to amend the state constitution to raise it, there was no
choice but to respect the provision.16
The comptroller appealed this decision to the Texas Supreme Court,
which denied the writ of error in a per curiam opinion on February 20,
1917.17 It similarly denied the motion for rehearing on March 28, 1917.18
By this time, Colquitt had been replaced in office, but his successor, James
“Pa” Ferguson, continued the practice of purchasing personal items with
state funds.19 He apparently promised to repay the state in the case of an
unfavorable court outcome in sworn testimony before the Texas Senate, but
that reimbursement never occurred.20 Ferguson was impeached, convicted,
and removed from office for misappropriating state funds in August and
9. Id. at 368–69.
10. Id.
11. The decision does not mention the term “standing,” which generally was not
employed by courts in 1916. Indeed, it was not even coined by the U.S. Supreme Court until
its 1944 decision, Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 302 (1944). See James Leonard & Joanne
C. Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article III, the Injury-in-Fact Rule, and the Framers’ Plan
for Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2001). However,
despite the fact that decisions from the early twentieth century (like Terrell) do not use this
modern-day terminology, commentators often consider them to be the first true “standing”
decisions. See infra Part I.A (discussing early federal standing jurisprudence); see also
Calvert v. Hull, 475 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1972) (discussing early Texas standing
jurisprudence).
12. Terrell, 187 S.W. at 369.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 372–73.
16. Id. at 371.
17. See Terrell v. Middleton, 191 S.W. 1138 (Tex. 1917).
18. See Terrell v. Middleton, 193 S.W. 139 (Tex. 1917).
19. See generally Parr, supra note 4.
20. See id.
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September of 1917.21 The bills for personal expenses thus cost one
governor his job.
Terrell v. Middleton, or the “Chicken Salad Case” as it is known in Texas
political lore,22 is notable for reasons apart from its curious fact pattern and
its sensational aftermath. The decision and its progeny have been cited
repeatedly throughout the ensuing decades for the now-uncontroversial
proposition that Texas taxpayers will have standing to challenge unlawful
state government expenditures.23 If one were to trace modern Texas state
taxpayer standing jurisprudence back to a progenitor case, this would be it.
The result in Terrell may be surprising to commentators, practitioners,
and students alike who are more familiar with the concept of taxpayer
standing under federal justiciability principles. Most learn in law school
that the rules are different in federal court. Federal taxpayers there
generally cannot challenge unlawful or illegal government expenditures
absent some unique, particularized injury, with one notable exception.24
Nor does this change if one claims standing as a state (and not federal)
taxpayer; recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions are clear that this type of
plaintiff also lacks standing.25
But Texas courts are not federal courts, and they are free to open their
doors to taxpayers challenging unlawful or illegal state expenditures if they
wish.26 And they have. Texas is not unusual in this regard. The majority
of other jurisdictions—though by no means all of them, as commentators
sometimes claim—likewise allow state taxpayer lawsuits, and many have
21. Id.; Ralph W. Steen, Ferguson, James Edward (1871–1944), HANDBOOK TEX.
ONLINE, http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/ffe05 (last visited Nov. 16,
2012). This was not the end of Ferguson’s political career. He unsuccessfully campaigned
for Texas Governor in 1918, President (as an independent) in 1920, and U.S. Senator in
1922. See id. His wife, Miriam “Ma” Ferguson, was a better politician. She twice was
elected Texas Governor, in 1924 and 1932. See John D. Huddleston, Ferguson, Miriam
Amanda Wallace [Ma] (1875-1961), HANDBOOK TEX. ONLINE, http://www.tshaonline.org/
handbook/online/articles/ffe06 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
22. See Calvert v. Hull, 475 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1972); see also Parr, supra note 4.
23. See, e.g., Calvert, 475 S.W.2d at 908; Hendee v. Dewhurst, 228 S.W.3d 354, 378
(Tex. Ct. App. 2007); Tex. Indus. Traffic League v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 628 S.W.2d 187,
193 (Tex. App. 1982); Johnson v. Ferguson, 55 S.W.2d 153, 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932);
Sherman v. Cage, 279 S.W. 508, 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); see also Williams v. Lara, 52
S.W.3d 171, 178–79 (Tex. 2001) (summarizing Texas taxpayer standing law); Comment,
Taxpayers’ Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895, 900 n.30 (1960) [hereinafter
Comment, Taxpayers’ Suits] (citing Terrell for the proposition that Texas taxpayers can sue
to enjoin an unlawful expenditure).
24. See, e.g., 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531.10.1 (3d ed. 2008) (“[A] workably clear
description can be provided as to federal taxpayer standing to challenge federal programs—
standing is allowed only in a narrow range of Establishment Clause cases, and might yet be
limited even further.”).
25. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 353–54 (2006) (no state taxpayer
standing to challenge Ohio tax credits); see also Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn,
131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011) (no state taxpayer standing to challenge Arizona tax credits).
26. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“[T]he constraints of
Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the
limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability . . . .”).
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for decades.27 In other words, among American court systems, the federal
rule is in the distinct minority. The question is why. Why have federal
courts evolved so dissimilarly from their state counterparts?
That state courts grant taxpayers much broader standing than federal
courts to challenge unlawful state expenditures is not a new observation;
commentators have long acknowledged the disparity.28 Yet none have ever
provided a convincing explanation for it. This Article fills in that gap. It
proposes that permissive state taxpayer standing doctrines are closely linked
to a ubiquitous type of state constitutional provision that is conspicuously
absent from the U.S. Constitution—namely, constitutional fiscal limitations
that specifically restrict states’ taxing, spending, and borrowing powers.
These state constitutional fiscal restrictions, which are intended to protect
the class of taxpayers as a whole, normally are unenforceable under
traditional injury-based standing rules. This Article argues that state
taxpayer standing rules have evolved accordingly to give the provisions
judicially enforceable teeth.
That thesis should make a great deal of sense. If the intended
beneficiaries of a state constitutional fiscal limitation would not have
standing to sue to enforce its provisions, then it is hard to see who would.29
The proposed link explains, for example, why the Texas appellate court
would allow a state taxpayer to challenge the “chicken salad” appropriation.
No one else would be injured by a violation of a constitutional
gubernatorial salary cap at issue, at least in any practical sense. When a
governor is paid more than he or she is constitutionally permitted, only the
taxpayers are harmed, albeit in an abstract and indirect way. It should not
be surprising that courts might let them sue.
This Article also ties together two notable strands of contemporary legal
scholarship. The first, originally proposed by Professor Helen Hershkoff,
suggests that distinct features of state constitutionalism can be an important
driving force behind state justiciability doctrines, including, most notably,
27. See infra Part II.A–B.
28. See infra Part II.B (discussing academic commentary on state taxpayer standing).
For example, in 1960, the Yale Law Journal published an extensive—and still-cited—survey
of the taxpayer standing rules in all fifty states. See generally Comment, Taxpayers’ Suits,
supra note 23.
29. Indeed, state courts have long offered this rationale to support their embrace of
permissive taxpayer standing doctrines. See, e.g., Dep’t of Admin. v. Horne, 269 So. 2d 659,
663 (Fla. 1972) (“Despite our reluctance to open the door to possible multiple suits by
‘ordinary citizens,’ nonetheless, it is the ‘ordinary citizen’ and taxpayer who is ultimately
affected and who is sometimes the only champion of the people in an unpopular cause.”);
Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 9 (Me. 1983) (“[O]ther than a taxpayers’ suit, there is
no mechanism available [to enforce the constitutional provision at issue]. . . . It would
conflict with the basic theory of American government if two branches of government, the
legislative and the executive, by acting in concert were able, unchecked, to frustrate the
mandates of the state constitution.”); Boryszewski v. Brydges, 334 N.E.2d 579, 581 (N.Y.
1975) (“We are now prepared to recognize standing where, as in the present case, the failure
to accord such standing would be in effect to erect an impenetrable barrier to any judicial
scrutiny of legislative action.”); see also Zeigler v. Baker, 344 So. 2d 761, 764 (Ala. 1977)
(same).
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taxpayer standing rules.30 The second, made most prominent by Professor
Richard Briffault, focuses on constitutional fiscal restrictions that limit a
government’s ability to tax, spend, and borrow, which are a little-examined
but important thread of state constitutionalism.31 This Article synthesizes
and builds on these influential theories.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this Article actually tests its thesis
through an empirical-historical survey of the early state taxpayer standing
cases in each permissive state. The results of the survey show that
constitutional fiscal restrictions are indeed involved in most of these cases
and in most states.32 In other words, insofar as this Article proposes that
state constitutional fiscal limitations are a major impetus for the creation
and development of permissive taxpayer standing doctrines, its empirical
findings are entirely consistent with that hypothesis.
Part I briefly summarizes the federal taxpayer standing rules. Part II
contrasts them with the far more permissive doctrines employed in most
states. Part III discusses various theories explaining this disparity and
introduces the more recent scholarship examining state constitutional fiscal
limitations. Part IV.A fully explains this Article’s thesis that the federalstate taxpayer standing disparity can be traced to these ubiquitous
restrictions. Part IV.B presents the survey of early state taxpayer standing
cases in every permissive jurisdiction undertaken to evaluate this theory.
Part V discusses the results.
I. TAXPAYER STANDING IN FEDERAL COURT
This Part discusses the current standards of taxpayer standing in federal
courts. It first details the general anti–taxpayer standing principles
(including the narrow Establishment Clause exception), and then discusses
state taxpayers specifically.
A. Federal Anti–taxpayer Standing Principles Generally
The basic issue of federal court taxpayer standing has been the subject of
tens or even hundreds of thousands of pages of academic and judicial
commentary over the past several decades, and it thus warrants only a brief
summary here.33 Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal courts’

30. See generally Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking
the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001).
31. See generally Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State
Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907 (2003).
32. See infra Part IV.B.2.
33. And yet, the subject is not any closer to being settled as a result of this voluminous
treatment. See Ann Althouse, Standing, In Fluffy Slippers, 77 VA. L. REV. 1177, 1182 n.21
(1991) (cataloguing criticisms); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE
L.J. 221, 221–22 (1988) (calling standing law “incoherent” and cataloguing criticisms);
Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 613–15 (2004) (discussing and
cataloguing academic criticism of standing jurisprudence).
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jurisdiction to cases and controversies brought before them.34 The Supreme
Court has interpreted this to mean that a plaintiff must have standing—or a
personal stake in the litigation—to bring his or her claims.35 The academic
literature refers to these injured parties with a direct interest in the litigation
as “Hohfeldian” plaintiffs; in contrast, scholars usually call litigants without
an individualized interest “non-Hohfeldian” plaintiffs.36 Commentators and
judges cite a well-rehearsed37 litany of policy reasons in support of the
federal standing doctrine.38 It is beyond the scope of this Article to
examine or evaluate these justifications.
The issue of standing often arises in federal court in the context of a
taxpayer lawsuit. Plaintiffs in these types of cases usually seek to challenge
purportedly unlawful government expenditures under the theory that they
have standing because their taxes ultimately funded some small fraction of

34. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Federal courts also apply “prudential” standing
limitations that are “founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the
courts in a democratic society.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). These
requirements preclude claims where, for example, a plaintiff’s grievance falls outside the
zone of interests protected by the statutory or constitutional provision invoked in his or her
lawsuit. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Prudential standing limitations
can be overridden by Congress. See, e.g., Craig R. Gottlieb, Comment, How Standing Has
Fallen: The Need To Separate Constitutional and Prudential Concerns, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
1063, 1066–67 (1994).
35. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442 (2011);
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 751 (1984); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 136–55 (4th ed.
1996) (discussing standing principles generally). As noted above, the concept of standing
traces back to the early twentieth century, but the term was not coined until the 1940s.
36. The “Hohfeldian/non-Hohfeldian” terminology is normally attributed to a 1968
article by Professor Louis Jaffe. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen As Litigant in Public
Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1034–35
(1968); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law
Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 & n.12 (1984)
(discussing the genesis of the term “Hohfeldian”).
37. Indeed, by 1988 one commentator dubbed the arguments “numbingly familiar.” See
Fletcher, supra note 33, at 222.
38. First, standing requirements might improve judicial decision making by requiring
litigants to be adverse parties who have a stake in the case and who will be likely to present
their side effectively. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). Second, the
requirements could help ensure that the parties most affected by a controversy can litigate it.
See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or
Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 311 (1979). Third, they can prevent
advisory opinions by courts that might not appreciate the real-world consequences of the
case at issue. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV.
1002, 1006 (1924). Fourth, standing requirements might increase judicial efficiency by
“filtering out” disputes that come before a court in a suboptimal form. See, e.g., Michael E.
Solimine, Recalibrating Justiciability in Ohio Courts, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531, 533–34
(2003). Finally, standing requirements could advance constitutional separation of powers
principles by ensuring that federal courts only engage in policymaking in cases involving
actual litigants. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing As an Essential Element
of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983).
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the illicit spending.39 Courts and commentators offer a handful of
arguments to support the justiciabililty of these lawsuits.40 They have been
the subject of extensive, but largely unsuccessful, federal standing-based
litigation for nearly a century.41
Indeed, the first modern Supreme Court standing case involved precisely
this fact pattern.42 In Frothingham v. Mellon,43 a taxpayer brought a
lawsuit against the Secretary of the Treasury to restrain payments to several
states that chose to participate in a federal program intended to encourage
cooperation between the U.S. and state governments for the purpose of
reducing infant mortality and protecting maternal health.44 She argued that
this program fell outside of Congress’s enumerated constitutional powers.45
The Court declined to reach the substance of the complaint. It disposed of
the case for “want of jurisdiction,” holding that any increased tax burden
would be spread across a vast and ever-changing number of taxpayers.46
The Court was especially troubled by the possibility that
[i]f one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then every other
taxpayer may do the same, not only in respect of the statute here under
review but also in respect of every other appropriation act and statute
whose administration requires the outlay of public money, and whose
validity may be questioned.47

39. See Susan L. Parsons, Comment, Taxpayers’ Suits: Standing Barriers and
Pecuniary Restraints, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 951, 951–52 (1986); 74 AM. JUR. 2D Taxpayers’ Actions
§ 1 (2012). Professor Nancy Staudt notes that the term “taxpayer lawsuit” encompasses two
types of claims—taxpayers challenging their own tax bill and taxpayers challenging a
government expenditure funded by their taxes. There is no controversy about the former
action; therefore, this Article, like its predecessors, focuses on the latter. Nancy C. Staudt, A
Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood) Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 776 (2003)
(discussing taxpayer lawsuits generally).
40. See Parsons, supra note 39, at 953–55. First, some courts observe that taxpayers
must replenish the government treasury for the improperly allocated funds, and thus, they
will suffer a pecuniary injury as a result of an unlawful expenditure. See id. at 953. Second,
other courts justify taxpayer lawsuits on a trust theory, viewing public officials as “trustees”
holding the public funds at issue “in trust” for taxpayers. See id. at 953–54. Finally, a third
group of courts view taxpayer actions as directly analogous to shareholder derivative
lawsuits. See id. at 54–55; see also 4 JOHN MARTINEZ, C. DALLAS SANDS & MICHAEL
LIBONATI, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 29.7 (2011) (detailing rationales).
41. But see Staudt, supra note 39, at 773–74 (observing that federal courts permit
taxpayer lawsuits more frequently than commentators assert).
42. The Court was confronted with a similar claim of taxpayer standing in Wilson v.
Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907), but it declined to resolve it. Id. at 31; see also Comment,
Taxpayers’ Suits, supra note 23, at 915 n.112.
43. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
44. Id. at 479–80.
45. Id. at 479.
46. Id. at 480, 487.
47. Id. at 487. More contemporary commentators argue that this view of Frothingham is
overly simplistic, and in fact, the case should be evaluated in its proper historical context
(i.e., it was decided only a short while after the federal courts abandoned the arcane writ
pleading system, and much of its analysis harkens back to that regime). See Stephen L.
Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1371, 1444–47 (1988).
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The general anti–taxpayer standing principles embraced in Frothingham
persisted throughout the next several decades.48 The Court seemed to
abruptly reverse course in 1968, however, when it held in Flast v. Cohen49
that a federal taxpayer had standing to challenge a federal program
providing educational assistance to certain religious schools.50 Chief
Justice Warren, writing for the majority, acknowledged the apparent
inconsistency between Frothingham and Flast. He distinguished the two
cases by noting that, whereas the former “merely” involved a situation in
which the federal government was alleged to exceed its delegated powers,
the latter concerned an expenditure that purportedly violated a specific and
express constitutional spending restriction (the Establishment Clause).51
Justice Warren’s opinion at least nominally established a new rule
whereby taxpayer lawsuits would be permitted when (1) the challenged
expenditure was made pursuant to Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers,
and (2) the expenditure violated some express constitutional provision
restricting those powers.52 Justice Harlan warned in dissent that these
limitations were untenable, and that the Flast holding ultimately would
erode to the point where the federal anti–taxpayer standing principles were
eviscerated.53 A concurring Justice Douglas agreed but welcomed the
outcome.54
Both were wrong. The ensuing decades saw a hasty retreat from Flast by
the Court.55 Two prominent 1974 decisions rejected taxpayer lawsuits
based on the Accounts and Compatibility Clauses of the U.S.
Constitution.56 In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc.,57 the Court further limited the Flast
exception by rejecting a challenge to the transfer of a government hospital

48. See, e.g., Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (rejecting a taxpayer challenge to the
nomination of Hugo Black to the Supreme Court); see also John DiManno, Note, Beyond
Taxpayers’ Suits: Public Interest Standing in the States, 41 CONN. L. REV. 639, 646 (2008)
(summarizing post-Frothingham cases).
49. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
50. Id. at 85–88.
51. Id. at 104–06.
52. Id. at 102–03; see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 71–72
(7th ed. 2011).
53. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 131 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (calling Frothingham limits
“untenable”).
54. Id. at 107 (Douglas, J., concurring) (predicting the ultimate “demise of
[Frothingham]”).
55. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 609–10 (2007);
see also DiManno, supra note 48, at 649. Commentators frequently refer to Flast as “limited
to its facts” or some similar formulation. Indeed, a Westlaw law review database search for
[Flast /20 limit! w/20 facts] conducted on February 22, 2012, generated 37 results, the
majority of which contained some version of this description.
56. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209 (1974)
(rejecting the Compatibility Clause); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974)
(rejecting the Accounts Clause).
57. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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to a religious organization because it did not implicate Congress’s taxing
and spending powers.58
Most commentators view Valley Forge as effectively cementing Flast’s
status as a one-off exception to the general federal anti–taxpayer standing
principles.59 The Court confirmed this interpretation in recent years. In
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,60 it was presented with a
challenge to an Executive Branch program intended to encourage faithbased organizations to compete for federal grants.61 The plaintiff attacked
the program on Establishment Clause grounds, asserting that his taxpayer
status gave him standing.62 Justice Alito, writing for the majority,
disagreed.63 He noted that the program was funded through general
executive appropriations and not a specific Article I, Section 8
appropriation.64 Justice Alito thus opined that “this case falls outside ‘the
narrow exception’ that Flast ‘created to the general rule against taxpayer
standing established in Frothingham.’”65 He endorsed the prevailing view
that “in the four decades since its creation, the Flast exception has largely
been confined to its facts.”66
B. State Taxpayers in Federal Court
The question of whether the taxpayer standing limitations in federal court
applied to plaintiffs challenging state (and not federal) expenditures was left
open for decades.67 Much of this uncertainty traces back to Frothingham
itself, which noted that “[t]he interest of a taxpayer of a municipality in the
58. Id. at 479. The Court noted that the transfer in Valley Forge was undertaken via the
Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This distinction
results in the absurd situation whereby a plaintiff would have standing to challenge an
appropriation of funds to a religious institution for the purpose of purchasing land, but he or
she would not have standing to challenge the transfer of the land itself. See, e.g., Valley
Forge, 454 U.S. at 511–12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the incoherence).
59. See, e.g., John J. Egan, III, Note, Analyzing Taxpayer Standing in Terms of General
Standing Principles: The Road Not Taken, 63 B.U. L. REV. 717, 717 (1983) (characterizing
Flast as “virtually overruled”); Eric B. Schnurer, Note, “More Than an Intuition, Less Than
a Theory”: Toward a Coherent Doctrine of Standing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 564, 566 (1986)
(“[Flast] is today essentially a dead letter.”).
60. 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
61. Id. at 594.
62. Id. at 596.
63. Id. at 597.
64. Id. at 605.
65. Id. at 608 (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988)).
66. Id. at 609. This was not enough for Justice Scalia. He opened his concurrence by
calling the distinctions between Flast and the subsequent taxpayer standing cases “utterly
meaningless.” Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia further opined that the Court should
either overrule Flast or grant standing to all taxpayers asserting a constitutional spending
violation. Id. at 633.
67. See Staudt, supra note 39, at 815–18 (concluding that as of 2003, “the full Court,
notwithstanding numerous opportunities, has failed to impose explicit limitations that mirror
the Flast doctrine for state taxpayers”); Richard M. Elias, Note, Confusion in the Realm of
Taxpayer Standing: The State of State Taxpayer Standing in the Eighth Circuit, 66 MO. L.
REV. 413, 413–25 (2001) (noting the same as of 2001).
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application of its moneys is direct and immediate and the remedy by
injunction to prevent their misuse is not inappropriate. It is upheld by a
large number of state cases and is the rule of this Court.”68
Federal courts have long interpreted this observation to grant standing to
taxpayers challenging county or municipal expenditures.69 Indeed, the
proposition that federal anti–taxpayer standing principles do not apply to
local taxpayers is now uncontroversial.70 That may seem odd at first blush.
There generally are orders of magnitude fewer taxpayers at the local level,
but on the other hand, a typical taxpayer pays far more to the federal
government and could be affected to a greater degree by an unlawful
expenditure of those tax dollars.71 And in any event, the idea that a federal
taxpayer who contributed (say) 0.000001 percent of a challenged
expenditure has not suffered a sufficiently particularized injury to convey
standing, whereas a local taxpayer who contributed 0.001 percent of one
has, makes little sense. Regardless, it is the law.72
But local taxpayers are not state taxpayers, and for many decades, the
Supreme Court was silent as to whether the latter group would have
standing to challenge purportedly unlawful state expenditures.73 Prior to
2006, the Court addressed state taxpayer standing on only one occasion, and
even then it did not resolve the question.74 Any confusion was dispelled in
68. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).
69. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 349 (2006); Staudt, supra
note 39, at 825–26 (discussing local taxpayer lawsuits); Kyle B. Gee, Note and Comment,
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno—Denying State Taxpayers Standing in Federal Court: Are
Municipal Taxpayers Next?, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 1241, 1251 (2007) (same); see also David
Spencer, Note, What’s the Harm? Nontaxpayer Standing To Challenge Religious Symbols,
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1071, 1072 n.2 (2011). Some question whether the rationale for
local taxpayer standing still holds in light of the Court’s recent anti–taxpayer standing
decisions. See, e.g., Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 641 F.3d 197, 221–22
(6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring) (arguing that the local taxpayer standing rule is no
longer defensible).
70. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 349 (citing without challenging
Frothingham’s local taxpayer exception).
71. See Staudt, supra note 39, at 841 n.328 (generally comparing federal and local tax
burdens). Professor Staudt also observes that many municipalities are actually bigger than
some small states, with correspondingly larger budgets. See id. at 841 & n.328.
72. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989) (reaffirming Frothingham’s
acceptance of municipal taxpayer suits). One explanation for this aspect of taxpayer
standing jurisprudence is that municipal taxpayers are more akin to a corporation’s
shareholders, and not citizens of a particular nation or state. Id. (hinting at a corporationbased explanation); Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487 (same).
73. See, e.g., Gee, supra note 69, at 1251–52 (discussing the Court’s preDaimlerChrysler state taxpayer standing jurisprudence); Staudt, supra note 39, at 815–18
(same).
74. See Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429 (1952). In Doremus, New
Jersey taxpayer-citizens challenged a state law providing for the reading of biblical verses at
the beginning of each school day. See id. at 430. The plaintiffs claimed standing as state
taxpayers. See id. at 431. The Court rejected the argument, essentially viewing the case as a
religious dispute and not an attempt to vindicate any legitimate taxpayer interest. See id. at
434–35. It left open the possibility that other state taxpayers might have standing, however,
observing that “[t]he taxpayer’s action can meet [the federal standing] test, but only when it
is a good-faith pocketbook action. It is apparent that the grievance which it is sought to
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DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno.75 The plaintiffs in the case consisted of
Ohio taxpayers.76 They challenged a state franchise tax credit intended to
encourage businesses to purchase new manufacturing equipment on the
theory that it violated the “dormant” or “negative” Commerce Clause.77
The plaintiffs claimed they had taxpayer standing because the credit
depleted the state taxpayer funds to which they had contributed.78 The
Court rejected the argument. It restated the basis for the anti–taxpayer
standing rule first announced in Frothingham and held: “The foregoing
rationale for rejecting federal taxpayer standing applies with undiminished
force to state taxpayers.”79 The Court recently reaffirmed this result in
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn.80
II. STATE TAXPAYER STANDING IN STATE COURT
Part II discusses state taxpayer standing rules as applied in state courts.
It focuses on both the state-by-state breakdown of which jurisdictions
permit taxpayer lawsuits, and then discusses the general variations in those
rules.
A. State Taxpayer Standing Rules Generally
It may be a tautology to say that state courts are not federal courts, but
this does not make the observation any less true. The substantially
dissimilar state taxpayer standing rules employed by the two types of
tribunals are an excellent real-world demonstration of this axiom. The
Supreme Court frequently has observed that state courts are not bound by
any standing and justiciability limitations arising from Article III of the
U.S. Constitution.81 This includes the general federal refusal to adjudicate
federal and state taxpayer lawsuits.82 State courts therefore are free to hear
litigate here is not a direct dollars-and-cents injury but is a religious difference.” Id. at 434;
see also Staudt, supra note 39, at 803–04 (summarizing Doremus’s holding).
75. 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
76. See id. at 338–39.
77. See Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 386 F.3d 738, 742–43 (6th Cir. 2004)
(describing the Commerce Clause theory).
78. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 337–39. Other plaintiffs claimed standing as local
taxpayers, arguing that any depletion to the state funds would ultimately deprive their local
government of state-provided moneys. Id. at 349–50. The Court rejected that argument as
merely “recasting” their state taxpayer challenge. Id. at 350.
79. Id. at 343–45.
80. See 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1444–45 (2011) (rejecting state taxpayer challenge to tuition tax
credits).
81. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized often
that the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts . . . .”); see also Hershkoff,
supra note 30, at 1836–37 (“State courts, however, are not bound by Article III, and judicial
practice in some states differs—and differs radically—from the federal model.”).
82. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law: A
Critique of the Supreme Court’s Theory that Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1289, 1295–96 (2005) (“State judges are not bound by Article III and
therefore can apply more lenient justiciability rules—for instance, by allowing taxpayer
standing. . . .”); Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1836–37.
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any and all lawsuits by taxpayers challenging a purportedly unlawful or
illegal expenditure if they wish. And they do. Most states—though not all,
as some suggest—allow state taxpayer actions, and they have for decades.83
Permissive taxpayer standing regimes derive from different sources in
different states. They are court-created doctrines in most jurisdictions.84 In
the remainder, a statute, civil procedure rule, or specific constitutional
provision authorizes at least some degree of taxpayer or citizen lawsuit.85
Whether a state’s taxpayer standing regime ultimately derives from the
common law or traces back to a statute, civil procedure rule, or
constitutional provision matters very little in practice, however. The
doctrines quickly take on a life of their own in either scenario, although a
few states take express statutory limitations seriously,86 and there are a
handful of procedural quirks that seem unlikely to have arisen
83. See, e.g., Jennifer Friesen, Recovering Damages for State Bills of Rights Claims, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1301 (1985); Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1855; Varu Chilakamarri,
Comment, Taxpayer Standing: A Step Toward Animal-Centric Litigation, 10 ANIMAL L.
251, 254–55 (2004); DiManno, supra note 48, at 656–57; Parsons, supra note 39, at 962–64;
Michael J. Zidonik, Suzanne Reynolds, & Evelyn J. Lambeth, Comment, Taxpayers’
Actions: Public Invocation of the Judiciary, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397, 402–03 (1977);
see also James W. Doggett, Note, “Trickle Down” Constitutional Interpretation: Should
Federal Limits on Legislative Conferral of Standing Be Imported into State Constitutional
Law?, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 840 n.8 (2008).
84. These tend to fall within three sometimes overlapping subcategories. Some
doctrines arise independently after a detailed analysis. See, e.g., Fergus v. Russel, 110 N.E.
130, 135–36 (Ill. 1915); Borden v. La. State Bd. of Educ., 123 So. 655, 659 (La. 1929).
Others borrow the well-established local taxpayer action tradition, often without detailed
analysis. See, e.g., Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Ky. 1965); Herr v. Rudolf, 25
N.W.2d 916, 919 (N.D. 1947). In a final group of state decisions, mostly dating to the early
1970s, courts rely on the seemingly apparent liberalization trend in Flast as the basis for
their own state rules. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 559 P.2d 630, 634–35 n.9 (Alaska 1977);
Dodge v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 600 P.2d 70, 72 (Colo. 1979).
85. There are not always clean divisions between these groups. In some states, for
example, a specific textual provision has been interpreted to authorize state taxpayer or
citizen lawsuits, but the actual language in question does not necessarily compel that result.
See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 16, § 13 (“Any citizen of any county, city or town may institute
suit, in behalf of himself and all others interested, to protect the inhabitants thereof against
the enforcement of any illegal exactions whatever.”); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526a (West
2011) (authorizing citizen-taxpayer lawsuits against “any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or
injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a county, town, city or city and county”);
Farrell v. Oliver, 226 S.W. 529, 529–30 (Ark. 1921) (holding that the Arkansas
constitutional provision permits state taxpayer lawsuits); Los Altos Prop. Owners Ass’n v.
Hutcheon, 137 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that section 526a has been
“judicially extended” to apply to state expenditures). In others, a permissive common law
taxpayer standing regime has evolved in some jurisdictions in parallel with an express
statutory provision. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-212 to -213 (2011) (statutorily
establishing the procedure for taxpayer lawsuits); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 123-b (McKinney
2002) (same); see also Wein v. Comptroller, 386 N.E.2d 242, 243–45 (N.Y. 1979). But see
Ethington v. Wright, 189 P.2d 209, 212–13 (Ariz. 1948) (independently authorizing common
law taxpayer actions); Boryszewski v. Brydges, 334 N.E.2d 579, 581 (N.Y. 1975) (same).
86. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 123-b(1) (authorizing taxpayer lawsuits, but
excepting challenges to government-issued debt); Wein, 386 N.E.2d at 244–45 (holding that
the statute prohibiting taxpayer challenges of state debt overrides the prior common law
regime).
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independently in the courts.87 But overall, state taxpayer standing rules
look indistinguishable in their development and implementation no matter
their legal origin.
The general permissiveness of state taxpayer standing doctrines has been
the subject of academic commentary since at least 1960.88 In that year, the
Yale Law Journal published a student work entitled Taxpayers’ Suits: A
Survey and Summary, which surveyed the taxpayer standing rules in every
state.89 It observed that thirty-four states allowed state taxpayer lawsuits,
fourteen others were unclear, and only two states definitively prohibited
them.90 Commentators generally view this as the first comprehensive
examination of state taxpayer standing rules, and they have cited it
extensively over the past fifty years.91
Scholarly discussion of the phenomenon has continued ever since. A
1961 article by Professor Louis Jaffe in the Harvard Law Review echoed
the observation that most states allowed state taxpayer lawsuits.92 A
student comment in the Wake Forest Law Review noted in 1977 that one of
the two states (New York) identified by the Yale Law Journal survey as
disallowing state taxpayer actions had reversed course, and by then only
New Mexico prohibited taxpayer actions.93 Similar articles popped up
throughout the 1980s and 1990s.94 Professor Hershkoff even observed that
permissive state court taxpayer standing rules had become so widely
acknowledged by 2001 that they were “for the most part uncontroversial.”95

87. In Massachusetts, for example, a taxpayer action will only be permitted if brought by
no fewer than twenty-four taxpayers, no more than six of whom may be from the same
county. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 29, § 63 (LexisNexis 2007); see also Richards v.
Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 67 N.E.2d 583 (Mass. 1946) (applying taxpayer standing
statute).
88. A 1937 student note in the Harvard Law Review touched—but did not focus—on
state taxpayer standing rules. See Note, Taxpayers’ Suits as a Means of Controlling the
Expenditure of Public Funds, 50 HARV. L. REV. 1275 (1937) [hereinafter Note, Controlling
the Expenditure].
89. See generally Comment, Taxpayers’ Suits, supra note 23.
90. Id. at 900–02.
91. See, e.g., Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 794, (9th Cir. 1999);
Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New Approach to
Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 664 (2011); Chilakamarri, supra note
83, at 259–62; Gee, supra note 69, at 1265 n.184; Louis L. Jaffe, Standing To Secure
Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1266 n.2 (1961). According to
West’s KeyCite service, as of November 16, 2012, the survey has been cited by thirty-nine
judicial decisions and thirty-five legal journals or secondary sources.
92. See Jaffe, supra note 91, at 1280–81 (observing that twenty-seven states expressly
permit state taxpayer lawsuits, and nine more might permit them).
93. See Zidonik et al., supra note 83, at 402–03.
94. See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 414–16 (1996);
Friesen, supra note 83, at 1301–03; Robert M. Myers, Standing in Public Interest Litigation:
Removing the Procedural Barriers, 15 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 3 (1981); Parsons, supra note
39, at 967–68; Michael Weiss, Comment, The Texas Tax Relief Act After Twelve Years:
Adoption, Implementation & Enforcement, 23 ST. MARY’S L.J. 491, 503–06 (1991).
95. See Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1854–55.
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Some commentators suggest that this disparity between federal and state
taxpayer standing doctrines is not particularly meaningful in practice. This
assertion dates back to at least 1969, when Professor Kenneth Davis argued
that the then-existing permissive state taxpayer standing rules had not
resulted in a flood of unmeritorious taxpayer lawsuits.96 Renowned state
constitutional scholar (and former Oregon Supreme Court Justice) Hans
Linde echoed the view in 2005, observing that during his tenure the Oregon
high court often was willing to reject cases on justiciability grounds, despite
the fact that Oregon courts permit taxpayer actions.97 This proposition is an
interesting one, though more rigorous empirical work suggests that the
question is more complicated than Professors Davis and Linde
envisioned.98
B. The Surprising Nonuniversality of State Taxpayer Standing Rules
And yet the notion that virtually every jurisdiction permits state taxpayer
lawsuits is largely overstated. Commentators have long characterized state
taxpayer standing rules as permissive “in nearly every state,”99 but that is
not entirely accurate. This Article’s survey of state taxpayer standing
doctrines observed that “only” thirty-six states—the majority to be sure, but
far from all—clearly permit state taxpayer lawsuits.100 In contrast, eight
states now prohibit state taxpayer actions, and it is unclear in six additional
states whether taxpayers can challenge purportedly unlawful state
government expenditures.101
The eight states that depart from the majority rule fall into two
categories. Three—Kansas, New Hampshire, and Virginia—simply reject
such lawsuits outright.102 One should not be too critical of their omission
from the academic state taxpayer standing commentary. The rejection of
permissive state taxpayer standing regimes is a recent phenomenon in
96. See Kenneth C. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450,
470–71 (1970).
97. See Hans A. Linde, The State and the Federal Courts in Governance: Vive la
Différence!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273, 1282–83 (2005).
98. See, e.g., Staudt, supra note 39, at 779–82. Professor Staudt suggests that taxpayer
lawsuits are far more commonly allowed in federal court than academic commentators
believe. Her Taxpayers in Court article documents a study finding dozens of Supreme Court
and hundreds of lower federal court cases involving taxpayer actions over the past several
decades. Id. at 800–04. This also could be occurring at the state level.
99. DiManno, supra note 48, at 656. For example, in 1985, Professor Jennifer Friesen
characterized state taxpayer standing rules as follows: “Every state now permits taxpayer
actions against municipalities, and all but New Mexico permit them for state taxpayers as
well.” Friesen, supra note 83, at 1301 n.165.
100. See infra Appendix.
101. See infra Appendix.
102. Kansas and New Hampshire disallow both state and local taxpayer actions, whereas
Virginia permits the latter. See, e.g., Theisman v. City of Overland Park, 253 P.3d 798, 2011
WL 2637452, at *8 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that Kansas courts do not permit taxpayer
actions); Baer v. N.H. Dep’t. of Educ., 8 A.3d 48, 51–52 (N.H. 2010) (rejecting state
taxpayer standing and overruling prior decisions to the contrary); Goldman v. Landsidle, 552
S.E.2d 67, 72 (Va. 2001) (expressly adopting the federal prohibition of taxpayer standing).
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Virginia (2001) and New Hampshire (2010), and state taxpayer standing
commentators have long been unclear with respect to Kansas.103
The remaining five definitive anti–taxpayer standing states—Indiana,
New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Wyoming—present a different story.
These states permit “public importance” or “public interest” lawsuits,
effectively in lieu of traditional taxpayer actions.104 Under the public
importance standing doctrine, undifferentiated citizens or residents of a
state will be permitted to bring a lawsuit challenging government conduct,
but only in cases involving a matter of “great” or “substantial” public
importance.105
It is tempting to characterize public importance lawsuits as the equivalent
of pure citizen actions and, thus, a broader form of taxpayer actions.106
This Article rejects that view. Both taxpayer and public importance
lawsuits involve non-Hohfeldian litigants, yet there are substantial
distinctions between the doctrines, and the universes of plaintiffs do not
overlap completely. Taxpayer lawsuits generally require that the plaintiff
has paid taxes,107 and the plaintiff normally must be challenging some
103. See Comment, Taxpayers’ Suits, supra note 23, at 901 n.33 (classifying Kansas
taxpayer standing law as unclear). The 1986 Temple comment by Susan Parsons cites a
Kansas civil procedure rule as authorizing taxpayer actions, but upon closer inspection, this
provision narrowly authorizes only challenges to unauthorized contracts. Compare KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-907 (1963), with Parsons, supra note 39, at 974 & n.176.
104. See State ex rel. Cittadine v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ind. 2003)
(describing Indiana public standing doctrine); State ex rel. Coll v. Johnson, 990 P.2d 1277,
1284 (N.M. 1999) (allowing citizen lawsuits involving “clear threats to the essential nature
of state government guaranteed to New Mexico citizens under their Constitution”); State ex
rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1082 (Ohio 1999)
(authorizing citizen lawsuits “when the issues sought to be litigated are of great importance
and interest to the public”); Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 116 (R.I. 1992) (“On rare
occasions this court has overlooked the standing requirement to determine the merits of a
case of substantial public interest.”); Jolley v. State Loan & Inv. Bd., 38 P.3d 1073, 1077
(Wyo. 2002) (“We have recognized a more expansive or relaxed definition of standing when
a matter of great public interest or importance is at stake.”). The standing rules in Ohio and
Rhode Island are more complicated than the foregoing generalization. Ohio permits state
taxpayer lawsuits for a plaintiff contesting an expenditure from a special fund. See State ex
rel. Masterson v. Ohio State Racing Comm’n, 123 N.E.2d 1, 2–3 (Ohio 1954). Rhode Island
allows taxpayers to sue if they have suffered a particularized injury not shared by other
similarly-situated taxpayers. See Ianero v. Town of Johnston, 477 A.2d 619, 621 (R.I. 1984).
For the purposes of this Article, these states seem sufficiently restrictive to be classified as
prohibiting such actions.
105. See, e.g., DiManno, supra note 48, at 665–77 (discussing public importance or
public interest doctrine). A handful of additional states allow both taxpayer and public
importance lawsuits. Id. at 677. Alaska is particularly difficult because it sometimes merges
the two doctrines, and it is hard to determine whether it permits taxpayer or public interest
lawsuits, or some hybrid of the two. See, e.g., Trs. for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324 (Alaska
1987) (discussing Alaska’s taxpayer-citizen standing doctrine). This Article errs on the side
of caution and characterizes it as a permissive taxpayer standing jurisdiction.
106. See, e.g., 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 24, § 3531.10.1, at 37
(“[T]axpayer standing often has been asserted as an alternative to a more general theory of
citizen standing.”).
107. See, e.g., Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2001) (holding that taxpayerplaintiff must be a taxpayer); Citizens Council Against Crime v. Bjork, 529 P.2d 1072, 1074
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government action that theoretically affects his or her tax burden.108 But
standing normally will exist if those criteria are met. Public importance
lawsuits, on the other hand, can be brought to challenge virtually any
government action, but only in extraordinary circumstances involving a
substantial public interest, as determined by the court overseeing the
lawsuit.109 Therefore, while some taxpayer lawsuits likely would be
permitted in public importance states (and vice versa), many would not, and
many public importance lawsuits are not taxpayer actions under any
reasonable definition of the term. It thus seems inappropriate to call these
states permissive taxpayer standing jurisdictions.
There are also six states in which it is at least somewhat unclear whether
state taxpayer lawsuits would be permitted. Three of the six—Idaho,
Hawaii, and Vermont—permit local taxpayer lawsuits.110 The state
decisions establishing this permissive taxpayer standing rule are broad
enough on their face that state taxpayer actions likely would be permitted,
but there were no published or reported decisions involving such lawsuits.
Nevada lacks any taxpayer standing jurisprudence (state or local), so one
cannot tell whether the state would permit state taxpayer actions. The
Michigan Supreme Court announced in 2001 that it generally would
prohibit taxpayer lawsuits under the theory that Michigan standing law is
equivalent to its federal counterpart,111 yet it reversed that holding nine
years later.112 Michigan ultimately is likely to permit state taxpayer
lawsuits, but this reversal was recent enough that no subsequent decisions
delineate the state’s taxpayer standing rules. Finally, the state taxpayer
standing cases in South Carolina are substantially contradictory, and the
status of the law is unclear.113
(Wash. 1975) (“[P]etitioner . . . . alleges that its members are taxpayers, but they are not
parties to this action. We cannot treat it as a taxpayer suit.”); 74 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 39,
§ 7.
108. For example, many states require that the taxpayer must be challenging an
expenditure made from a fund into which he or she actually paid. See infra note 119 (listing
cases from Arkansas, Iowa, Maine, and Minnesota requiring that the challenged expenditure
must be from a fund into which the taxpayer-plaintiff has paid or will pay). But see infra
note 122 (noting that Colorado, West Virginia, and perhaps Washington may permit state
taxpayer actions challenging nonfiscal government conduct).
109. See, e.g., DiManno, supra note 48, at 665–77 (discussing public importance standing
requirements); Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1857–58 (same).
110. See, e.g., Akau v. Olohana Corp., 652 P.2d 1130, 1133–34 (Haw. 1982); Ameritel
Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 119 P.3d 624, 627–28 (Idaho 2005); Cent. Vt.
Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Town of Springfield, 379 A.2d 677, 679 (Vt. 1977). With respect to
Vermont, one state supreme court decision references a prior case in which state taxpayers
were permitted to challenge unlawful expenditures, but the cited decision does not directly
address the issue of taxpayer standing. See Brigham v. State, 889 A.2d 715, 719 (Vt. 2005).
111. See, e.g., Lee v. Macomb Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 629 N.W.2d 900, 907–08 (Mich.
2001).
112. See Lansing Schs. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 699
(Mich. 2010).
113. Compare ATC S., Inc. v. Charleston Cnty., 669 S.E.2d 337, 340–41 (S.C. 2008)
(“The injury to ATC, however, as a taxpayer is common to all property owners in Charleston
County. This feature of commonality defeats the constitutional requirement of a concrete
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So what should be made of the fact that the permissiveness of state court
standing rules is not quite as universal as commentators suggest? First, as
indicated by the recent New Hampshire and Virginia decisions restricting
state taxpayer standing rules and even the since-reversed similar trend in
Michigan, the same narrowing of taxpayer standing principles at the federal
level seems to be trickling down to at least a handful of states.114 This
should not be surprising given the influence of federal justiciability law on
state courts.115
Second, the characterization of state taxpayer standing regimes as
uniformly permissive invokes an understandable, but unfortunate, tendency
among academics to view certain areas of state law as relatively
homogenous on a state-to-state basis, and then compare this single generic
“state” law with its federal counterpart.116 This may help to highlight a
noteworthy contrast between federal and the mainstream or majority state
law on a particular issue, but it does so at a substantial cost. The
overgeneralization can portray states as more homogenous than they really
are. That, in turn, minimizes differences between states that could be just as
worthy of analysis as the federal-state contrast that the commentators were
trying to address in the first place.117 For example, the mainstream view
and particularized injury.”), with Sloan v. Dep’t of Transp., 666 S.E.2d 236, 241 (S.C. 2008)
(“Nonetheless, ‘[a] taxpayer’s standing to challenge unauthorized or illegal governmental
acts has been repeatedly recognized in South Carolina.’” (citing Sloan v. Sch. Dist. of
Greenville Cnty., 537 S.E.2d 299 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000))). The state also permits citizen
lawsuits invoking an important public interest. See Sloan v. Sanford, 593 S.E.2d 470, 472
(S.C. 2004).
114. See Gee, supra note 69, at 1273–76 (“Taxpayer standing has paralleled standing
doctrine in general, which, since the founding era, has become increasingly more
preclusive.”); Staudt, supra note 39, at 773 (“[T]he undisputed view among legal scholars
and commentators is that taxpayers, for a brief period in history, did have standing to bring
lawsuits in federal court but judges for the most part have denied taxpayers the opportunity
to be heard in court.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Schnurer, supra note 59, at 566 (noting
the same).
115. See Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and Constitutional SocioEconomic Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 923, 969–70
(2011); see also City of Greenwood Vill. v. Petitioners for the Proposed City of Centennial,
3 P.3d 427, 436 n.7 (Colo. 2000) (“[S]imilar considerations underlie both Colorado and
federal standing law, and we frequently consult federal cases for persuasive authority.”);
Dover Historical Soc’y v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 838 A.2d 1103, 1111 (Del.
2003) (“This Court has recognized that the Lujan requirements for establishing standing
under Article III to bring an action in federal court are generally the same as the standards
for determining standing to bring a case or controversy within the courts of Delaware.”);
ACLU of N.M. v. Albuquerque, 188 P.3d 1222, 1227 (N.M. 2008) (“New Mexico’s standing
jurisprudence indicates that our state courts have long been guided by the traditional federal
standing analysis.”).
116. See, e.g., David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 708
(2005) (“To the extent that state courts consult the academic literature, they are likely to find
either that their own state constitutions are not discussed at all, or that their constitutional
law is fungible with that of other states . . . .”).
117. What these differences might mean is a different story altogether. For example, the
early “New Judicial Federalism” proponents argued that state constitutions reflect the
specific character and values of their respective states; critics of this movement generally
scoff at that, arguing that the view is divorced from any historical reality. See, e.g., James A.
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that state taxpayer standing rules are uniformly permissive easily could
obscure the recent microtrend in a handful of states to eliminate or narrow
these doctrines. This is a development that deserves comment, yet the
mainstream view that sees state taxpayer standing doctrines as uniformly
permissive precludes that discussion.
C. The Contours of State Taxpayer Standing Rules
The specific contours of the various state taxpayer standing doctrines can
reflect fundamental attributes that are responsible for the creation and
purpose of permissive taxpayer standing regimes in the first place, and as
such, a brief discussion is warranted.118 Perhaps the most frequent state
taxpayer standing requirement is that there must be a nexus between the
plaintiff’s taxes and the government conduct being challenged. In other
words, a taxpayer can only challenge government conduct that has the
potential to affect his or her tax burden, even if only in a minute way. This
often means that a state expenditure involving a specific fund can only be
challenged by taxpayers who have paid into that fund.119 Some states
further limit taxpayer standing to actions challenging allegedly improper
government expenditures, and not revenue collection measures.120 Others
distinguish between illegal expenditures (which can be challenged) and
improvident ones (which cannot).121 All of that said, a handful of states
allow taxpayers to challenge virtually any government conduct, regardless
of how it affects state taxpayer dollars.122 Taxpayer actions in these
Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretation of State
Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional Argument, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1219, 1221
(1998).
118. That said, previous commentators have compiled an exhaustive list of the various
state taxpayer standing requirements, and it is unnecessary to do so here. See, e.g.,
Chilakamarri, supra note 83, app. A at 271.
119. See, e.g., McGhee v. Ark. State Bd. of Collection Agencies, 243 S.W.3d 278, 283
(Ark. 2006) (holding that a taxpayer must have contributed to the challenged expenditure);
Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 698 N.W.2d 858, 871 (Iowa 2005) (a taxpayer must show an effect
on a fund to which he or she has paid or will pay); Collins v. State, 750 A.2d 1257, 1260–61
(Me. 2000) (same); see also Conant v. Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, L.L.P., 603 N.W.2d
143, 147 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that taxpayers lacked standing to challenge legal
fees because the fees would not necessarily be deposited in a fund into which they had or
would pay).
120. See, e.g., Citizens for Rule of Law v. Senate Comm. on Rules & Admin., 770
N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); Manzara v. State, 343 S.W.3d 656, 659–61 (Mo.
2011) (holding that tax credits are not expenditures); see also Munger v. State, 689 S.E.2d
230, 239–40 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (declining to extend state taxpayer standing rules to
situations not involving unlawful expenditures); Fent v. Contingency Review Bd., 163 P.3d
512, 520 (Okla. 2007) (emphasizing that a taxpayer can challenge an unlawful expenditure).
121. See, e.g., Soukup v. Sell, 104 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tenn. 1937).
122. See, e.g., Barber v. Ritter, 196 P.3d 238, 246–47 (Colo. 2008) (suggesting that
taxpayers will have standing to challenge any constitutional violation); Smith v. W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ., 295 S.E.2d 680, 683 (W. Va. 1982) (“Moreover, where the right sought to be
enforced is a public one in the sense that it is based upon a general statute or affects the
public at large the mandamus proceeding can be brought by any citizen, taxpayer, or
voter.”); see also Greater Harbor 2000 v. City of Seattle, 937 P.2d 1082, 1090–91 (Wash.
1997) (noting the same with respect to a local taxpayer action and implying that the principle
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jurisdictions are little more than citizen lawsuits with the extra requirement
that the plaintiff has paid taxes.
Another typical standing limitation is that taxpayers can only seek to
enjoin prospective spending. Courts in these states do not permit taxpayer
actions attempting to recoup prior unlawful expenditures on behalf of the
government.123 Taxpayers in other jurisdictions cannot sue to compel a
government official to undertake an affirmative action—they can only
block an improper expenditure.124 A few states impose the requirement that
a taxpayer-plaintiff must show an actual impact on his or her taxes.125 It is
not enough to allege that public funds are being improperly spent; the
taxpayer must aver facts sufficient to show that the illicit spending actually
results in higher taxes. States vary as to how specific that showing must
be.126
One not-uncommon requirement is that the taxpayer-plaintiff must alert
the relevant government unit to the improper conduct before initiating the
lawsuit, and he or she can only proceed with the case if the government
refuses to take corrective action.127 The failure to provide this notification

would hold at the state level); Parsons, supra note 39, at 971–73 & nn.147–57 (discussing
the trend in some states to allow taxpayer challenges to nonfiscal conduct).
123. See, e.g., Beckerle v. Moore 909 So.2d 185, 187–88 (Ala. 2005); Dewhurst v.
Hendee, 253 S.W.3d 320, 331–32 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008).
124. See, e.g., Reeder v. Wagner, No. 435, 2008 (Del. June 2, 2009), available at
http://courts.delaware.gov/OPINIONS/download.ASPx?ID=122440; Mouton v. Dep’t of
Wildlife & Fisheries, 657 So. 2d 622, 626–28 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
125. See, e.g., Seymour v. Region One Bd. of Educ., 874 A.2d 742, 749 (Conn. 2005)
(“‘It is not enough for the plaintiff to show that her tax dollars have contributed to the
challenged project . . . . [T]he plaintiff must prove that the project has directly or indirectly
increased her taxes . . . .’” (citing Seymour v. Region One Bd. of Educ., 803 A.2d 318
(Conn. 2002))); Kerpelman v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 276 A.2d 56, 60–61 (Md. 1971) (same);
Demartino v. Marion County, 184 P.3d 1176, 1179–80 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (same); see also
Berent v. City of Iowa City, 738 N.W.2d 193, 202–03 (Iowa 2007) (holding that when a
taxpayer pays into the fund from which an illegal expenditure is made, an actual impact on
taxes is presumed).
126. For example, in Connecticut’s restrictive taxpayer standing regime, a suggested
inference that an illegal expenditure necessarily will increase the plaintiff’s taxes will not be
enough to convey standing. See, e.g., Conn. Post LP v. State Traffic Comm’n, No.
X01CV990160337S, 2000 WL 33983848, at *5–6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 2000). Iowa
courts, in contrast, sometimes permit such inferences. See Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 698
N.W.2d 858, 865 (Iowa 2005).
127. See, e.g., Parsons v. S.D. Lottery Comm’n, 504 N.W.2d 593, 596 (S.D. 1993) (“[I]n
taxpayer actions, the plaintiffs are required to ask the state attorney general to bring an action
on behalf of the public or show why such request would be futile.”); Saucier v. Emp’t Sec.
Dep’t of the State of Wash., 954 P.2d 285, 287–88 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that in
taxpayer actions, plaintiffs must first request action by the attorney general, and can only
bring suit upon denial of this request); Jenner v. Wissore, 517 N.E.2d 1220, 1227–28 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988) (same); see also Marjorie A. Shields, Application of Municipal Taxpayer
Standing Doctrine, 51 A.L.R.6TH 333 (2010); Necessity and Sufficiency of Efforts To Induce
Public Officers To Bring Suit as Condition of Taxpayer’s Right To Bring Suit, 124 A.L.R.
585 (1940) (cataloguing authorities). This requirement sometimes is statutory. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-213 (2011) (permitting a lawsuit by an Arizona taxpayer only
with sixty days notice to the attorney general).
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is a bar to bringing a taxpayer lawsuit in some states,128 whereas others
have carved out exceptions (e.g., notice is unnecessary if it would be
pointless).129
A few jurisdictions also permit taxpayer actions only for certain types of
claims, usually limited to those invoking an important public policy
interest. Alaskan taxpayers, for instance, can only challenge “substantial”
government expenditures.130 Taxpayers in Florida and perhaps Arizona
will only have standing to challenge an unconstitutional (and not “merely”
unlawful) government action absent a special interest.131
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, a few states limit taxpayer
actions to only those lawsuits that would be unable to be brought outside of
the taxpayer action context due to a lack of traditional standing.132 Courts
in these jurisdictions recognize that some claims against the government do
not lend themselves to the type of particularized injury normally required to
convey standing. Any nominally affected state taxpayer can challenge the
allegedly improper government conduct, but only when no one else likely
would have standing to do so. This limitation is perhaps the most
interesting one because it reflects one of the first—and still most
convincing—rationales for allowing taxpayer lawsuits in the first place.
III. EXPLAINING THE FEDERAL-STATE DISPARITY
This next part discusses different explanations for the disparity between
federal and state taxpayer standing principles. It first addresses traditional
theories before moving onto a discussion of the contributions Professor
Hershkoff has made to state constitutional discourse. This part then
discusses the dynamic between permissive taxpayer standing rules and the
limitations on government discretion over fiscal matters resulting from state
constitutional provisions.

128. See, e.g., Parsons, 504 N.W.2d at 596 (holding that the only exception to the
attorney general notice requirement is when he or she is already a party).
129. See, e.g., Farris v. Munro, 662 P.2d 821, 823–24 (Wash. 1983) (noting an exception
to the notice rule when requiring it would be useless).
130. See Hoblit v. Comm’r of Natural Res., 678 P.2d 1337, 1340–41 (Alaska 1984) (the
magnitude of the challenged transaction will be an important factor in determining whether
to permit the action to proceed).
131. See N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Fornes, 476 So .2d 154, 155–56 (Fla. 1985); Dep’t of
Revenue v. Markham, 396 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1981). Arizona is more complicated. State
taxpayer actions are permitted both by statute and the common law in that jurisdiction. See
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-213 (authorizing taxpayer lawsuits by statute under certain
circumstances); Ethington v. Wright, 189 P.2d 209 (Ariz. 1948) (permitting taxpayer lawsuit
under the common law). Some authority from the state suggests that common law taxpayer
standing actions will only be permitted to challenge unconstitutional (and not “merely”
unlawful) expenditures. See Bennett v. Napolitano, 81 P.3d 311, 318 (Ariz. 2003).
132. See Transactive Corp. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 706 N.E.2d 1180, 1184
(N.Y. 1998) (rejecting a common law taxpayer action because there was no indication that
no other potential plaintiff would have standing); Consumer Party of Pa. v. Pennsylvania,
507 A.2d 323, 329 (Pa. 1986) (stating a five-part test governing taxpayer lawsuits, the first
part of which is whether “the governmental action would otherwise go unchallenged”).
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A. Traditional Theories
The last point segues nicely into a discussion of the theories offered to
explain the general permissiveness of state taxpayer standing rules in state
courts and the corresponding narrow federal regime. The early commentary
focused on three aspects of state taxpayer standing doctrines. First, a
smattering of articles from the 1960s through the 1980s speculated that
permissive state taxpayer standing rules evolved so as to permit judicial
challenges to broad swaths of governmental activity that otherwise would
have been immune from lawsuit under a federal injury-in-fact
requirement.133 This assertion has some empirical support, as evidenced by
the state court decisions identifying the enforceability of constitutional
and/or statutory provisions as a main impetus for their embrace of liberal
taxpayer standing rules.134
Yet despite this observable link between enforceability concerns and
these doctrines, and although more than one commentator has called
potential unenforceability the “fundamental reason” underlying permissive
state taxpayer standing rules,135 the few early scholars to address the
argument did not elaborate on it. The failure to develop this idea is
unfortunate. As discussed extensively throughout this Article, the notion
that state taxpayer standing doctrines evolved to give teeth to potentially
unenforceable state constitutional provisions generally seems correct, at
least in the very specific context of state constitutional fiscal limitations.136
A second, earlier theory explaining liberal state taxpayer standing rules is
somewhat more developed. The first articles to approach the subject of
state taxpayer standing in a more analytical fashion focused on the
historical tradition permitting taxpayer lawsuits at the local level, arguing
that this pedigree largely explains why most states allowed such actions by
the early 1960s.137 They essentially contend that state courts oftentimes co133. See, e.g., Comment, Taxpayers’ Suits, supra note 23, at 910–11; Parsons, supra note
39, at 955.
134. See supra note 29 (citing authorities from Alabama, Florida, Maine, and New York);
see also Faden v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 227 A.2d 619, 621–22 (Pa. 1967) (“[T]he fundamental
reason for granting standing is simply that otherwise a large body of governmental activity
would be unchallengeable in the courts.”).
135. See Parsons, supra note 39, at 952–55 (1986); see also Chilakamarri, supra note 83,
at 254 (favorably quoting Parsons).
136. See infra Parts IV.B.2, V.A.
137. See, e.g., Note, Controlling the Expenditure, supra note 88, at 1277–78. The 1960
Yale Law Journal survey, Taxpayers’ Suits, also opened with a discussion of the American
historical precedents involving local taxpayers, which dated back to the mid-nineteenth
century. See Comment, Taxpayers’ Suits, supra note 23, at 896–99. It acknowledged that
this line of authorities primarily evolved through municipal taxpayer lawsuits, but argued
that, at the end of the day, there was little to distinguish these cases from state taxpayer
actions, and thus it was only natural that state courts would evolve to permit them. Id. at
900–02. Professor Jaffe expanded upon this approach in his 1961 article. He closely
examined the early development of public actions generally, and taxpayer lawsuits
specifically, in English and American courts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See
Jaffe, supra note 91, at 1269–82. Like the Yale survey, he noted that the development of
state taxpayer standing doctrines occurred almost exclusively through local actions, implying
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opt the well-established tradition of permitting municipal or county
taxpayer lawsuits and expand that doctrine to encompass analogous state
actions.
The main problem with both explanations is that they only tell half the
story. With respect to the first argument, for example, it is certainly true—
and again, empirically observable in the case law—that concerns about the
enforceability of a particular constitutional provision or statute outside of
the taxpayer action context are a major impetus for the state taxpayer
standing doctrines in place in some jurisdictions.138 But so what? There
are federal constitutional provisions that, if violated, would be unlikely to
result in a particularized injury sufficient to convey Article III standing to
challenge those violations.139 They have not inexorably led to permissive
federal taxpayer standing rules.140 Indeed, the Supreme Court addressed
this precise issue in United States v. Richardson,141 and it emphatically
rejected the idea that the potential unenforceability of a constitutional
provision (in that case, the Accounts Clause142) is an argument in favor of
taxpayer standing—quite the opposite, the Court opined.143 The argument
may be a coherent theory on its face to explain why states generally permit
taxpayer lawsuits, but it is substantially undercut by the federal-state
disparity in practice.
A similar point holds with respect to the local taxpayer action analogy.
No one disputes that there is a strong historical basis for allowing local
taxpayer lawsuits at the state level, and some courts no doubt were
influenced by those rules to adopt an identical doctrine for state
taxpayers.144 But the same historical tradition is present at the federal level
as well. Federal courts have long permitted municipal or county taxpayer
lawsuits; this practice was expressly preserved in Frothingham, and it
remains good law today.145 As such, the second theory also fails to explain
that this was the genesis of the then-current permissive state taxpayer standing rule. Id. at
1281–82.
138. See supra notes 29, 134 and accompanying text.
139. The Establishment Clause is the most notable of these, but there are a handful of
others. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (authorizing Congress “[t]o raise and support
Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
Years”); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (prohibiting the alteration of Congressional
compensation until after an intervening election of Representatives).
140. See supra Part I.A (discussing restrictive federal taxpayer standing rules).
141. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
142. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
143. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179–80. The Court observed: “In a very real sense, the
absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the
argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately
to the political process.” Id. at 179.
144. See supra note 84 (discussing states that adopt local taxpayer standing rules at the
state level).
145. See supra Part I.B (discussing the permissive municipal taxpayer standing rules in
federal court). Some commentators speculate that in light of the increasingly restrictive
federal standing decisions, the Frothingham municipal taxpayer standing exception is
ultimately endangered. See, e.g., Gee, supra note 69, at 1273–78.
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why these analogous local taxpayer standing rules were so influential in
state but not federal court.
A third potential explanation for the permissive state taxpayer standing
doctrines offered by earlier146 and sometimes even contemporary147
scholars is a purely textual one. This rationale—if true—actually could
explain why these rules are different at the state and federal levels, and not
just why state courts might generally grant broad state taxpayer standing.
The theory points to the Article III case and controversy requirement and
suggests that because state constitutions frequently do not contain this
language, the difference between the forums can be attributed to that
omission.148
This argument, however, is ultimately unconvincing for two reasons.
First, many of the jurisdictional clauses in state constitutions actually
contain roughly equivalent language to the federal case and controversy
requirement.149 Yet the vast majority of these states still allow taxpayer
lawsuits.150 There is nothing inherent in the particular wording of state
analogues to the federal case and controversy requirement that explains why
the federal jurisdictional grant has been interpreted so restrictively.
This textual theory also ignores the widespread influence of federal
standing jurisprudence on state decisions in the field, even in the absence of
any similar state constitutional provision. Some state constitutions may
lack a textual equivalent to the Article III jurisdictional grant, but this does
not mean that federal principles play no part in the creation of state
justiciability rules. To the contrary, state courts borrow heavily from their
federal counterparts—especially with respect to standing requirements—
when formulating these doctrines, even without any case and controversy

146. See, e.g., Friesen, supra note 83, at 1299–1300; James A. Gardner, The Failed
Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 808–09 (1992) (attributing
liberal state taxpayer standing rules to a lack of limiting constitutional language).
147. See, e.g., Joy Chia & Sarah A. Seo, Battle of the Branches: The Separation of
Powers Doctrine in State Education Funding Suits, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 125, 128
(2007); Robert J. Klee, What’s Good for School Finance Should Be Good for Environmental
Justice:
Addressing Disparate Environmental Impacts Using State Courts and
Constitutions, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 135, 164–65 (2005); Linde, supra note 97, at 1275;
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, Citizen Suits, and the Enforcement of Federal
Environmental Law by Non–Article III Plaintiffs, 110 YALE L.J. 1003, 1006–07 & n.16
(2001).
148. See, e.g., Klee, supra note 147, at 164–65 (“State courts are courts of general
jurisdiction, governed by state constitutions that seldom have ‘case or controversy’ (or
jurisdictional) requirements for standing as federal courts . . . .”); Elmendorf, supra note 147,
at 1006 (“Most state courts are courts of general jurisdiction, unfettered by constitutional
provisions analogous to Article III.”).
149. See Doggett, supra note 83, at 876–77 (discussing state equivalents to the Article III
“case and controversy” requirement). For example, the California Constitution grants
California courts jurisdiction over “cause[s].” See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 12(a). The
constitutions of Alaska, Kansas, North Carolina, and Oregon all expressly grant their state
courts jurisdiction over “cases.” See Doggett, supra note 83, at 876 n.236.
150. See supra Part II.B (observing that only eight states expressly disallow taxpayer
lawsuits).
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approximation.151 Why should taxpayer standing principles be immune
from this influence?
So all of these traditional explanations for the general permissiveness of
state taxpayer standing rules are fundamentality unsatisfying. Either the
theories fail to explain the federal-state taxpayer standing disparity, or they
are substantially belied in practice. What could explain the phenomenon,
then? One recent scholar took a promising step toward answering this
question.
B. Hershkoff’s State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”
The Harvard Law Review published Professor Hershkoff’s sweeping
article, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function,152 in 2001. The article explores the similarities and differences in
federal and state justiciability rules in substantial detail, arguing that any
inconsistencies can and do—and should—reflect disparities in state and
federal institutions and the purposes of governance and structure underlying
them.153 Hershkoff touched upon a number of distinct justiciability
doctrines in her comprehensive work, including taxpayer and citizen
lawsuits, moot disputes, political questions, and advisory opinions.154 Her
piece has been enormously influential to the state constitutional discourse
over the past decade.155
Hershkoff dedicated several pages of the article to a discussion of the
status of public action litigants in state court, including, most notably, state
taxpayer lawsuits.156 She noted that almost every state allows some degree
of taxpayer actions, even in the absence of a showing of an increased tax
burden or particularized injury.157 Hershkoff went on to describe these

151. See, e.g., City of Greenwood Vill. v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial,
3 P.3d 427, 436 n.7 (Colo. 2000) (“[S]imilar considerations underlie both Colorado and
federal standing law, and we frequently consult federal cases . . . .”); Dover Historical Soc’y
v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 838 A.2d 1103, 1111 (Del. 2003) (federal standing
standards “are generally the same as the standards for determining standing to bring a case or
controversy within the courts of Delaware”); ACLU v. City of Albuquerque, 188 P.3d 1222,
1227 (N.M. 2008) (despite the lack of a state equivalent to the case and controversy
requirement, “[New Mexico] courts have long been guided by the traditional federal
standing analysis”).
152. Hershkoff, supra note 30. Hershkoff’s titular quotation, “Passive Virtues,” is a
reference to Professor Alexander Bickel’s seminal 1961 Harvard Law Review article, The
Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
153. See generally Hershkoff, supra note 30.
154. Id.
155. Specifically, according to West’s KeyCite service, as of November 16, 2012, ten
courts—all of them state appellate tribunals—and 124 legal journals or other secondary
works have cited her article.
156. Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1852–59.
157. Id. at 1855. Hershkoff observed that New Mexico’s standing rules properly could be
seen to permit citizen (and not taxpayer) standing in cases involving an important public
interest. Id. at 1856 n.123 (citing State v. Johnson, 990 P.2d 1277, 1284 (N.M. 1999)).
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generally permissive taxpayer standing rules as “for the most part
uncontroversial.”158
None of this was particularly new or groundbreaking; commentators have
offered similar assessments for decades.159 But Hershkoff went one step
further in her analysis. She linked the permissive state taxpayer standing
rules to a feature of state constitutionalism that had not been previously
suggested. Hershkoff wrote: “Because state constitutions include many
substantive social and economic provisions, taxpayer standing provides an
important mechanism for regulatory enforcement and policy elaboration,
sometimes placing interbranch disputes before the court.”160 Her article is
more specific in a footnote explaining this proposed connection between
liberal standing rules and substantive state constitutional provisions. There,
Hershkoff offered the example of constitutional provisions regulating and
circumscribing legislative discretion over fiscal matters, citing a 1991 law
review article discussing state constitutional debt limitations.161
Hershkoff revisited this idea later in her piece. In a section addressing
the applicability of the principles and arguments supporting restrictive
federal justiciability doctrines, she again suggested that permissive state
taxpayer standing rules were appropriate in light of certain unique
characteristics of state constitutionalism. Hershkoff cited the oftendiscussed inclusion of “positive rights and regulatory norms” in state
constitutions, which she argued “explicitly engage state courts in
substantive areas that have historically been outside the Article III
domain.”162 She specifically identified positive right guarantees163 such as
the provision of free public schools and the regulation of various public
service entities like corporations, railroads, and banks.164
The notion that there is a distinct connection between liberal state
taxpayer standing rules and substantive social and economic state
158. Id. at 1855.
159. See supra Part II.A (discussing commentary on permissive state taxpayer standing
rules).
160. Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1855 (footnotes omitted). At least one prior
commentator implicitly acknowledged the correlation between permissive state taxpayer
standing rules and state constitutional litigation, though she did so summarily and did not
propose any link between the concepts. See Friesen, supra note 83, at 1302 (calling taxpayer
suits to enforce state constitutional rights “commonplace”).
161. Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1855 n.116 (citing Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S.
Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of Constitutional
Debt Limitations, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1301).
162. Id. at 1889–90.
163. “Positive rights” provisions have long been a popular topic among state
constitutionalists. See Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions and Individual Rights:
Conceptual Convergence in School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 301, 316–19
(2011). See generally Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good Enough for Government Work: The
Interpretation of Positive Constitutional Rights in State Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1459
(2010). Indeed, Professor Hershkoff has frequently written on the issue. See, e.g., Helen
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality
Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999).
164. See Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1890.
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constitutional regulatory provisions is undeniably attractive at first blush.
These constitutional provisions generally are absent at the federal level, and
therefore, Hershkoff’s suggested link provides a succinct and compelling
explanation for both the permissive state taxpayer regimes employed in
most states, as well as the corresponding federal-state disparity.
Yet certain aspects of the argument do not resonate as well on closer
inspection. For example, the implication that permissive state taxpayer
standing doctrines are necessary or especially well-suited to allow state
courts to intervene in disputes over positive rights is incomplete at best. If a
state or local government is required to do something by the state
constitution, then it is entirely plausible that an affected individual might
suffer an actionable injury-in-fact if the state failed to comply with this
obligation, even under traditional injury-based standing rules.165 Imagine,
for instance, a state constitutional provision guaranteeing a free public
education. That is a classic constitutional positive right, and yet there
appears to be no reason why a child who is promised this schooling would
be unable to claim the requisite legal injury if that public service is
withheld. Injury-based standing rules seem perfectly sufficient to enforce
that type of constitutional provision.166
Nor does the fact that state constitutions sometimes regulate banks or
railroads or corporations seem particularly relevant to the lenient taxpayer
standing rules in state court. Federal law regulates all of those as well, and
federal courts obviously take an opposite view on the issue of taxpayer
standing. Furthermore, it is not hard to imagine that if a state government
failed to properly enforce or apply one of these substantive regulatory
provisions, one or more individuals might suffer a necessary injury-in-fact
to convey standing under traditional justiciability rules.167

165. See, e.g., Usman, supra note 163, at 1519–20 (“Interpreting positive rights does not
inherently press the courts into the narrow domain of cases that constitute non-justiciable
political questions. To the contrary, positive rights, like their negative rights counterparts,
invite judicial interpretation.”).
166. This hypothetical is not novel or unprecedented. See Lobato v. State, 216 P.3d 29,
35 (Colo. App. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 218 P.3d 358, 367 (Colo. 2009). In Lobato,
the Colorado Court of Appeals held that parents of students had injury-based standing to
challenge the failure of the state to provide sufficient funds for education in violation of the
Colorado Constitution’s “positive right” guaranty. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court did not
disturb this determination. See Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 363 (Colo. 2009).
Commentators are in accord with this result. See James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to
Preschool?, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 49, 85 (2006) (discussing justiciability of positive right
education cases); Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty To Support “Public”
Schools, 48 B.C. L. REV. 909, 966–68 (2007) (same).
167. For example, Hershkoff cites the Oklahoma Constitution’s regulation of monopolies
and its imposition of miner safety standards. See Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1890 n.300
(citing OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 44; id. art. VI, § 26). But if a company was engaging in
monopolistic business practices, one would expect that its competitors or customers might
suffer a particularized injury-in-fact sufficient to attempt to compel the Oklahoma
government to enforce that constitutional provision. Similarly, if the state government failed
to enforce miner safety standards, one of the affected miners could claim his or her
heightened personal risk as a sufficient injury to convey standing. There may be some
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Still, it is impossible to deny that Hershkoff’s argument was a thoughtful
and original idea, and one which can shed a great deal of light on a
phenomenon that has received surprisingly little attention from
contemporary scholars.168 It should come as no surprise, then, that several
judges and commentators have since embraced—mostly uncritically—her
proposed connection between permissive state taxpayer standing doctrines
and substantive state constitutional social and economic regulatory
provisions.169 And in fact, although this link is overbroad to some degree,
it contains a great deal of truth. That thesis is the focus of the rest of this
Article.
C. State Constitutional Fiscal Limitations and
Briffault’s Disfavored Constitution
One conspicuous omission in the foregoing critique of Professor
Hershkoff’s article should be readily apparent. The positive rights and
detailed regulatory provisions often found in state constitutions may be
inadequate to explain why state courts generally permit taxpayer lawsuits,
whereas federal courts do not. But the same cannot be said about her
largely unspoken implication that there is some link between permissive
taxpayer standing rules and state constitutional provisions limiting a state
government’s discretion over economic or fiscal matters.170 Those very
specific constitutional restrictions seem particularly apt to trigger the
enforceability concerns that some courts and commentators associate with
liberal taxpayer standing doctrines.171 And perhaps just as importantly,
prudential question as to whether the state is the proper defendant in that scenario, of course,
but this would not implicate a question of injury-based standing.
168. Professor Hershkoff responded to these criticisms in our correspondence. She
observed that state constitutional provisions like positive rights and regulatory measures
generally were not actionable at common law, especially in cases involving solely
nongovernmental litigants, which is an argument that she has fleshed out at length. See
Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional
Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1541–46 (2010). Two immediate
rebuttals come to mind. First, this Article solely envisions lawsuits against governmental
entities (and not private litigants) as a method to enforce positive right and regulatory
constitutional provisions. Second, as an empirical matter, recent decades have seen a
number of lawsuits seeking to exercise these types of constitutional provisions that were
permitted by the state courts. See supra note 166. In any event, she certainly raises an
excellent point, and one that warrants future inquiry.
169. See Manzara v. State, 343 S.W.3d 656, 673–74 (Mo. 2011) (Wolff, J., concurring)
(citing Hershkoff for the proposition that “[t]he differences in taxpayer standing cases reflect
the profound differences between the constitutions under which these courts function”); see
also Chia & Seo, supra note 147, at 129 (also citing Hershkoff); John C. Reitz, Standing To
Raise Constitutional Issues, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 437, 460 (Supp. 2002) (favorably quoting
Hershkoff for the same); DiManno, supra note 48, at 661 (same); Doggett, supra note 83, at
873–74 n.222 (same).
170. See Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1855 n.116, 1889–90 (citing constitutional debt
restrictions as an example of state constitutional efforts to “constrain state and local fiscal
authority”).
171. Indeed, there is a well-developed literature discussing the problem of standing in the
context of a specific sort of constitutional fiscal restriction—a balanced budget amendment.
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these limitations at least nominally are intended to protect the class of
taxpayers as a whole.172 If the taxpayer-beneficiaries would not have
standing to challenge violations of these specific fiscal limitations expressly
designed to protect them, then it is hard to see how anyone else would.
Perhaps those provisions could explain the difference in federal and state
taxpayer standing rules.
A few examples may help to demonstrate this potential dynamic. To use
the same specific constitutional fiscal limitation identified by Hershkoff,
consider a restriction on the issuance of government debt.173 Who would
be injured if a state government blatantly violated it? Not the government
that illegally borrowed the money, and not the debtholders who willingly
lent it—indeed, the taxpayers and/or citizens of the particular jurisdiction
would seem to have the most plausible claim of injury, however broad or
widely disseminated.174 Or imagine a not-uncommon state constitutional
provision forbidding a state or local government from providing funds to be
used for abortion services.175 Even if a state agency began directly and
unabashedly paying providers in connection with every abortion provided
in the state, it is unlikely that any specific individual would suffer the
particularized harm necessary to convey standing under an Article III
analysis. After all, the only persons even affected by such an action would
be the beneficiaries of those illicit funds.
Nor are these sorts of fiscal limitations a minor or inconsequential
component of state constitutions. They are littered throughout the

See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1105, 1165–66; Donald B. Tobin, The Balanced Budget Amendment: Will Judges
Become Accountants? A Look at State Experiences, 12 J.L. & POL. 153, 185–88 (1996); Gay
Aynesworth Crosthwait, Note, Article III Problems in Enforcing the Balanced Budget
Amendment, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1065, 1073–82 (1983).
172. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 908–09 (“[F]ar less attention has been paid to a
distinctive feature of state constitutions that has little to do with civil liberties or positive
rights—the many provisions that seek to protect taxpayers by limiting the activities and costs
of government.”); Phillip J.F. Geheb, Tax Increment Financing Bonds As “Debt” Under
State Constitutional Debt Limitations, 41 URB. LAW. 725, 732–33 (2009) (characterizing the
purpose of debt limitations as “protect[ing] the public from the inherent ‘shortsightedness’ of
legislatures to incur debt without considering the burden on future taxpayers”); see also
Reuven Mark Bisk, Note, State and Municipal Lease-Purchase Agreements:
A
Reassessment, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 521, 521–22 (1984) (same). Academic
commentators are not alone in this assessment of the purpose behind constitutional fiscal
restrictions. See Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 10 (Me. 1983) (“[T]he taxpayers of
the state are surely among the principal intended beneficiaries of that [constitutional public
purpose] provision.”); Dep’t of Ecology v. State Fin. Comm., 804 P.2d 1241, 1246 (Wash.
1991) (stating the same with respect to debt limitations).
173. See Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1855 n.116.
174. But see Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth Amendment
Style, 33 TULSA L.J. 561, 607 (1997) (suggesting that bondholders might have standing).
175. See, e.g., Hotaling v. Hickenlooper, 275 P.3d 723 (Colo. App. 2011) (challenging
cancer screening grants awarded to abortion providers allegedly in violation of a
constitutional abortion funding ban). In the interest of full disclosure, the author was lead
counsel for the State in this case.
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constitutional landscape in virtually every state.176 Indeed, a few scholars
have identified these fiscal restrictions as a main feature distinguishing state
constitutions from their federal counterpart.177 Professor Briffault is the
most prominent of them. His 2003 article, Foreword: The Disfavored
Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law,178 closely
examines the state constitutional fiscal limits that (he argues) are intended
to protect taxpayers by limiting the activities and costs of government.179
Briffault identified several such provisions that can be found in most, if not
virtually all, state constitutions.
These include public purpose
requirements, which expressly limit the authority of state or local
governments to transfer public moneys or other financial assistance to
private enterprises;180 antigift clauses, which prevent a state from lending
its credit to private individuals or corporations;181 debt limitations, which
take a variety of forms but generally restrict the ability of state or local
governments to incur debt;182 and tax and expenditure limitations, which
broadly restrict the amount of taxes that can be assessed and collected by
176. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative
Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 WIS. L. REV.
1301, 1315–16 (noting that over three-quarters of states have constitutionalized debt
restrictions).
177. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 31, at 908 (“The Federal Constitution says next to
nothing about public finance, and when it does so, it either provides authority for
congressional action or sets procedures for raising and spending money. It places just a
handful of substantive constraints on federal taxation and no restrictions on federal
borrowing at all.”); G. Alan Tarr, Subnational Constitutions and Minority Rights: A
Perspective on Canadian Provincial Constitutionalism, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 767, 774 (2009)
(state constitutional fiscal limitations are “without parallel or precedent in the Federal
Constitution”); see also Susan P. Fino, A Cure Worse than the Disease? Taxation and
Finance Provisions in State Constitutions, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 959, 969–70 (2003) (attributing
the proliferation of constitutional fiscal limitations to easily amendable state constitutions);
David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2605–07 (2005)
(discussing state constitutional fiscal regulation). As discussed below, the absence of
specific federal constitutional fiscal limits can be overstated. See infra Part V.C.
178. See Briffault, supra note 31.
179. See id. at 908–09. Briffault was not the first to suggest that the main goal of state
constitutional fiscal limitations is to protect state taxpayers as a whole. See, e.g., Note, Legal
Limitations on Public Inducements to Industrial Location, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 619–23
(1959).
180. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 910–15. Commentators generally attribute the
provisions to the “disastrous consequences” of government investment in private enterprises
in the first half of the nineteenth century, specifically including the Erie Canal debacle, when
thirteen states defaulted on their debts to some degree. Id. at 910–11.
181. Id. at 911–12. These clauses generally were added to state constitutions during the
nineteenth century in response to the Panic of 1837, which saw several states lend their
credit to speculative railroad enterprises and then declare bankruptcy when the projects
collapsed. See, e.g., Nicholas J. Houpt, Note, Shopping for State Constitutions: Gift Clauses
As Obstacles to State Encouragement of Carbon Sequestration, 36 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 359,
363–64, 381–83 (2011) (discussing the origin of gift clauses).
182. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 915–18. Debt limitations restrict the ability of
governments to borrow money. See id. at 915–16. They are more varied than public purpose
requirements or antigift clauses. Some prohibit debt outright, some limit it to a dollar figure
or percentage of the state budget, and some impose supermajority legislative or voter
approval requirements on the issuance of debt. Id.
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state and local governments and the particular services on which these
revenues can be spent.183 Briffault characterized these fiscal restrictions as
fundamentally defining state constitutionalism as much or even more than
the more popular positive rights and expansive individual liberties invoked
by many contemporary state constitutionalists.184
Yet Briffault was more interested in exploring how these constitutional
fiscal limitations were enforced and applied in practice. He called them the
“disfavored constitution” for two reasons. Briffault first noted that, as of
2003, these provisions had not received much attention from scholars who
generally preferred to focus on higher profile topics.185
Second, and perhaps more interestingly, Briffault argued that state courts
have generally disfavored these constitutional fiscal limitations in
practice.186 He contended that they often construe the fiscal limits as
narrowly and formalistically as possible in order to avoid constraining state
and local government discretion.187 Briffault suggested a number of
explanations for this phenomenon.188 He ultimately concluded that these
fiscal limitations are a crucial—though little-discussed—aspect of state
constitutionalism, and the participants in the decades-long discourse over
state constitutional law might benefit from considering them.189
Briffault was not the first commentator to examine many of the specific
state constitutional fiscal limitations central to his piece.190 He was not
183. Id. at 927–39. These provisions limit a state’s ability to impose taxes and
appropriate expenditures. Like debt restrictions, they can take a variety of forms. The early
constitutional limits tended to focus on property taxes, but in the past century, they became
quite diverse and were expanded to various types of state taxation and spending. Id. at 929–
34.
184. Id. at 908–09.
185. Id. at 908 & n.8. Briffault noted that even the most ardent critics of state
constitutionalism tended to focus on issues involving federal constitutional analogues. Id. at
908 (citing Gardner, supra note 146, at 780–98); see also Richard C. Schragger, Democracy
and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 869–72 (2012) (echoing that conclusion with respect to debt
and tax limitations).
186. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 909–10, 939–44.
187. Id.; see also Darien Shanske, The Supreme Court and the New Old Public Finance:
A New Old Defense of the Court’s Recent Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 43
URB. LAW. 659, 703 & n.200 (2011) (citing Briffault for the proposition that state courts
construe state constitutional fiscal limitations narrowly).
188. These explanations include the influence of post–New Deal federal jurisprudence,
which views such economic matters as political questions; judicial sympathy with the
purposes behind the government programs at issue; a pervasive view among judges that
violations of these fiscal restrictions are essentially victimless infractions; and the possibility
that courts view these limitations as artifacts that do not reflect contemporary political
reality. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 939–44.
189. Id. at 955–57.
190. See, e.g., Dale F. Rubin, Constitutional Aid Limitation Provisions and the Public
Purpose Doctrine, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 143 (1993) [hereinafter Rubin,
Constitutional Aid Limitation] (discussing limits on the use of public moneys or other assets
to aid private entities); Dale F. Rubin, Public Purpose in the Northwest: A Sinkhole of
Judicial Interpretation—The Case for Alternatives in the Delivery of Public Services and the
Granting of Subsidies, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 417 (1996) [hereinafter Rubin, Public Purpose]
(same); Sterk & Goldman, supra note 176, at 1301 (discussing debt limitations); Kristin E.
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even the first to observe that state courts are often reluctant to enforce
various types of these provisions.191 His article was, however, perhaps the
first scholarly work to conceptualize this sprawling web of “Briffaultian”
fiscal limitations as a pervasive thread of state constitutionalism, which had
been dismissed or minimized by courts and commentators alike.192
Scholars have cited it favorably over the past several years, both for the
proposition that these limitations constitute a distinct strain of state
constitutionalism, as well as part of a more detailed examination of specific
types of fiscal restrictions.193
IV. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL FISCAL LIMITATIONS AND PERMISSIVE STATE
TAXPAYER STANDING RULES: TESTING THE LINK
Part IV sets forth this Article’s hypothesis: that there is a link between
the generally permissive state taxpayer standing rules and the prevalence of
state constitutional fiscal limitations. It then presents the results of an
empirical-historical study intended to evaluate this theory.
A. Proposing a Link Between State Constitutional Fiscal Limitations and
Permissive State Taxpayer Standing Rules
The juxtaposition of Professor Hershkoff’s discussion of generally
permissive state taxpayer standing regimes and Professor Briffault’s
examination of state constitutional fiscal limitations is not intended to be
subtle. This Article fundamentally argues that the two concepts are
inextricably linked, with the latter acting as a direct impetus for the former.
According to this theory, most of the detailed fiscal limitations frequently
found in state constitutions—but generally not in their federal
Hickman, Comment, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Interpreting
the Pennsylvania Uniformity Clause, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1695 (1999) (discussing taxation
uniformity provisions); Justin J.T. Hughes & Garth B. Rieman, Comment, A New
Generation of State Tax and Expenditure Limitations, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 269 (1985)
(discussing government expenditure limitations).
191. See, e.g., Rubin, Constitutional Aid Limitation, supra note 190, at 143–45 (observing
that state courts are reluctant to enforce public purpose requirements); Rubin, Public
Purpose, supra note 190, at 417–19 (same); Sterk & Goldman, supra note 176, at 1358–60
(observing that state courts are reluctant to enforce constitutional debt restrictions).
192. Professor Robert F. Williams, a leading state constitutional theorist, provided an
introduction to Briffault’s piece (among others) in the Fifteenth Annual Issue on State
Constitutional Law in the Rutgers Law Journal. Robert F. Williams, Introduction, 34
RUTGERS L.J. 905 (2003). He called the Disfavored Constitution “an exceptionally
thoughtful consideration of the very important, but relatively low-visibility, fiscal provisions
in state constitutions. . . . These fiscal provisions, concerning governmental taxation,
spending, and borrowing, are among the most important in state constitutions concerning the
way we govern ourselves.” Id. at 905.
193. See, e.g., G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Getting from Here to
There: Twenty-First Century Mechanisms and Opportunities in State Constitutional Reform,
36 RUTGERS L.J. 1075, 1111–12 & nn.169–71 (2005); Tarr, supra note 177, at 773–74; see
also Michael J. McCarthy, Silicon Valley Taxpayers Association: Local Voters, State
Propositions, and the Fate of Property Assessments, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1899, 1904 (2009)
(discussing constitutional fiscal limitations in California).
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counterpart194—specifically are intended to protect taxpayers from the
improper or ill-advised use of their funds by the state government.195 Only
state taxpayers as a whole, and not any particularized individual or group,
will normally be injured if these Briffaultian restrictions are disregarded or
violated. This Article argues that taxpayer standing rules have evolved in
many jurisdictions to reflect this dynamic by allowing individual taxpayers
to challenge purported violations of these widespread and specific—but
otherwise unenforceable—state constitutional fiscal limitations.
In other words, state courts often face a dilemma. They can ignore a
specific and detailed constitutional restriction on government fiscal conduct
designed to protect a broad but definable class of people, simply because
these beneficiaries are the undifferentiated class of state taxpayers. Or they
can give the Briffaultian limitations judicially enforceable teeth by allowing
a non-Hohfeldian plaintiff to sue on behalf of this class, despite the
taxpayer-plaintiff’s lack of traditional injury-based standing. Neither
alternative must be especially appealing, but courts must pick one
nonetheless. It should not be surprising that state courts often choose the
latter option. This Article thus proposes the following hypothesis: the
permissive state taxpayer standing rules in place in most states are closely
linked with ubiquitous state constitutional fiscal restrictions, which would
be otherwise unenforceable by the very beneficiaries that they are intended
to protect.
This all may sound familiar, because it is. The idea closely tracks the
rationale for permitting Establishment Clause taxpayer challenges
announced in Flast. There, Chief Justice Warren focused narrowly on the
fact that the Establishment Clause is a clear and specific limitation on
Congress’s Article I, Section 8 taxing and spending power.196 He rejected
the proposition that taxpayer standing would exist in the absence of such a
direct and express spending restriction.197 Yet Warren pointedly declined
to speculate as to the existence of any other additional specific
constitutional spending limitations, noting that “[w]hether the Constitution
contains other specific limitations can be determined only in the context of
future cases.”198 The Flast majority opinion itself therefore refused to
answer the question of whether Establishment Clause challenges are a
special one-time exception to the general federal anti–taxpayer standing
rules, or whether the principle announced in the case was a doctrine of
general applicability that could be invoked in the future under a similar set

194. See Sterk & Goldman, supra note 176, at 1315–16 (cataloguing claims that the U.S.
Constitution is devoid of fiscal limits).
195. See supra note 171 (listing various commentators and courts who describe state
constitutional fiscal limitations as intended to protect the public).
196. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 104–06 (1968).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 104–05. For a thorough discussion of the court’s opinion, see Debra L.
Lowman, A Call for Judicial Restraint: Federal Taxpayer Grievances Challenging
Executive Action, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651, 665–67 (2007).
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of circumstances (i.e., a specific and direct spending restriction prohibits a
particular federal expenditure), however uncommon they might be.
This last observation raises an interesting point. Commentators and
courts understandably portray Flast as being drastically ratcheted back or
“limited to its facts” over the past several decades; they essentially endorse
the first of these two possible interpretations of the decision.199 But
perhaps the second view is the better one. Perhaps the circumstances in
which the Flast exception will be applicable are just so rare at the federal
level that they only occur (or at least, have only occurred so far) in the
Establishment Clause context. Or to pose this possibility as a question:
What if the reason why the Establishment Clause exception to the general
federal prohibition on taxpayer lawsuits has never been expanded to any
other specific federal constitutional spending restrictions is only because
federal courts have not found any? In that case, at least some substantial
portion of the purported Flast retrenchment should be attributed not to a
hostility toward the decision by the courts (though that hostility certainly
exists), but instead to the fact that these courts have simply answered “no”
to Warren’s open question.200
The sprawling landscape of state constitutionalism, and especially
Briffault’s “disfavored constitution,” provides a wonderful contrast to this
view of Flast and its aftermath. As opposed to the U.S. Constitution and its
infamously scant fiscal restrictions, state constitutions are chock full of such
undeniably specific and detailed fiscal limitations.201 The post-Flast
evolution of federal taxpayer standing rules might have been quite different
if the U.S. Constitution resembled its state counterparts in this regard.
Federal taxpayers might commonly be permitted to bring lawsuits
challenging federal expenditures as violating one of these hypothetically
numerous specific federal constitutional fiscal limitations in that alternate
universe. And indeed, that is exactly what this Article postulates has
happened at the state level. The widespread “specific constitutional
limitations imposed upon an exercise of the [government’s] taxing and
spending power,”202 so crucial to Warren’s Flast analysis, have caused state
taxpayer standing rules to take very different and more permissive paths
than did their federal equivalent.
This argument meshes well with many of the technical restrictions
applied to taxpayer actions in the various states. The mainstream
requirement limiting taxpayer lawsuits to situations in which there is a
199. See supra Part I.A (discussing post-Flast retrenchment).
200. That notion is consistent with the views of post-Flast judges and commentators. See
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1445 (2011) (quoting Hein for
the same principle); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 609 (2007)
(noting that the Court has “declined to lower the taxpayer standing bar in suits alleging
violations of any constitutional provision apart from the Establishment Clause”); see also
13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 24, § 3531.10.1 (same).
201. See supra Part III.C (discussing the prevalence of state constitutional fiscal
limitations).
202. Flast, 392 U.S. at 105.
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sufficient economic nexus between the plaintiff’s taxes and the government
conduct being challenged—and in some states, even further limiting
challenges to government expenditures and not revenue collection
measures—is well-suited to serve as a practical limitation confining
taxpayer lawsuits to fiscal challenges.203 Similarly, only affirmative
spending can violate a specific fiscal limitation, which by definition
restricts government conduct and does not mandate that it undertake or
perform any affirmative duty. The common requirement that a taxpayer can
only enjoin an improper expenditure, and not compel the government to
take some type of action, therefore serves as an important gatekeeping
mechanism limiting taxpayer actions to fiscal challenges.204 Finally, the
relationship between the rule in a few states limiting taxpayer actions to
constitutional or “substantial” claims and the idea that state taxpayer
standing doctrines are closely linked with state constitutional fiscal
restrictions should speak for itself.205
It is important to emphasize one final point. This Article’s thesis is not
created from whole cloth. The argument that state constitutional fiscal
limitations are a primary driving force behind these liberal standing
doctrines is, in one sense, little more than an elaboration on Hershkoff’s
original idea that state justiciability rules often are linked to substantive
state constitutional provisions.206 Yet despite that promising hint toward
the ultimate genesis of the doctrines and Briffault’s contemporaneous
“disfavored constitution” commentary, no scholar has really examined the
seemingly promising connection between the two specific concepts. The
silence on this score is disappointing. There are fifty states, and only a little
less than three-fourths of them clearly employ permissive taxpayer standing
doctrines. There is no need to theorize in the abstract about what might or
might not be responsible for the creation and development of these
permissive rules; one could simply look at the cases themselves to see what

203. See supra Part II.C (discussing the rule limiting taxpayer challenges to unlawful
expenditures).
204. See supra Part II.C (discussing the rule confining taxpayer challenges to lawsuits
seeking to enjoin government expenditures and not to compel affirmative conduct).
205. See supra Part II.C (discussing states limiting taxpayer actions to substantial or
constitutional challenges).
206. See supra Part III.B (discussing Hershkoff’s theory). Furthermore, and as noted
above, at least one high profile court decision has identified this precise link. In Common
Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1 (Me. 1983), the Maine Supreme Court was faced with a taxpayer
lawsuit attacking an arrangement whereby the city of Bath, Maine, the state of Maine, and a
major shipping company would finance, build, and operate a ship repair facility. See id. at 5–
6. The plaintiffs argued that certain aspects of the transaction violated the Maine
Constitution’s public purpose and credit provisions. See id. at 7–8. The state and city asked
the Maine courts to reject the action for lack of standing. See id. at 8. The Maine Supreme
Court ultimately disagreed, stating that, “other than a taxpayers’ suit, there is no mechanism
available [to enforce the constitutional provisions at issue]. . . . It would conflict with the
basic theory of American government if two branches of government, the legislative and the
executive, by acting in concert were able, unchecked, to frustrate the mandates of the state
constitution.” Id. at 9–10.
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types of claims are involved in the decisions establishing liberal taxpayer
standing regimes in various states.
This Article undertakes just such an inquiry. It evaluates the foregoing
thesis linking permissive state taxpayer standing doctrines and
constitutional fiscal limitations through an empirical-historical survey
examining the types of claims involved in the early taxpayer standing cases
in all permissive jurisdictions. The results and their implications are set
forth below.
B. The Survey
This Section offers the methodology and typology of the survey used to
test the Article’s hypothesis and then presents the survey’s results.
1. Methodology and Typology
The task of identifying the decisions leading to the current state taxpayer
standing doctrine in place in a given state is theoretically straightforward.
One need only locate a few current state taxpayer standing cases and then
trace back the decisions they cite (and then the decisions cited by those, and
so on) until an ascertainable case law establishing the current rule is
identified. The reality of the task is far more complicated, however.
This complexity is due to several reasons. First, standing rules in many
states have changed over the past century or more—and sometimes, they
have changed more than once.207 These changes are also often partial and
incomplete. Courts frequently modify, expand, or restrict the rule in effect
at the time of the decision without reversing it.208 It was not easy to decide
how to classify each state in light of this dynamic. Therefore, the survey
incorporated the following rules: First, only state taxpayer standing rules
currently employed in a jurisdiction were included. If there was an earlier
taxpayer standing doctrine that subsequently was reversed, the nowinoperative prior regime was ignored. If the rules had been only modified
in the past (i.e., a subsequent decision partially altered existing permissive
rules), however, then the cases establishing the original rule were included.
Second, the survey also generally includes only decisions in which
standing was granted. It seemed problematic to evaluate the creation and
development of a permissive state taxpayer standing doctrine through cases
207. Compare Lee v. Macomb County Bd. of Comm’rs, 629 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Mich.
2001) (expressly adopting federal Article III standing requirements despite earlier precedent
to the contrary), with Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686,
688 (Mich. 2010) (overruling Lee); see also Wein v. Comptroller, 386 N.E.2d 242, 244–45
(N.Y. 1979) (noting the shift first to permit taxpayer lawsuits, then to restrict them for
certain types of claims).
208. See Wein, 386 N.E.2d at 245 (upholding common law standing rule but precluding
certain types of lawsuits where such a prohibition is consistent with the legislative intent of a
parallel taxpayer standing statute); see also Munger v. State, 689 S.E.2d 230, 239–40 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2010) (explaining that recent North Carolina authorities would only permit taxpayer
standing to challenge a government expenditure and not a discriminatory statue).

2012]

DISFAVORED CONSTITUTION, PASSIVE VIRTUES?

1299

rejecting standing. They might only reflect that the claim at issue was not
the type of challenge generally associated with such doctrines. There were
a few instances, however, in which a first progenitor decision in a
jurisdiction rejected standing in a way that unequivocally established a pro–
taxpayer standing rule in the relevant state.209 One cannot trace the
evolution of taxpayer standing rules in these jurisdictions without
considering those decisions; thus, they are included.
Third, the survey only includes state—and not local—taxpayer standing
decisions. That may sound obvious on its face given this Article’s specific
focus, but the question is more difficult in practice. State decisions do not
always distinguish between state and local taxpayer lawsuits when
addressing the issue of taxpayer standing.210 Given this lack of distinction,
it is tempting to ignore the constraint limiting the survey to state taxpayer
lawsuits. If local taxpayer cases are instrumental and even interchangeable
in the creation and development of particular state taxpayer standing rules,
after all, why should they be excluded from the survey?211 The answer is
that these local taxpayer cases play some role—to varying degrees—in the
evolution of state taxpayer standing doctrines in many jurisdictions. It
would be all but impossible to distinguish the state taxpayer cases that are
directly or substantially influenced by analogous local precedents from
those that are only indirectly or incidentally influenced by them. Rather
than undertake this unworkable task, the survey applies a bright-line rule
and includes only the state taxpayer standing jurisprudence itself.
Those are the basic “ground rules”; now for the methodology. The
primary goal of the survey was to locate the first progenitor case in every
209. See, e.g., McKinney v. Watson, 145 P. 266, 267 (Or. 1915) (rejecting state taxpayer
standing in the case but holding that such standing will generally exist); Lyon v. Bateman,
228 P.2d 818, 823–24 (Utah 1951) (holding that state taxpayers should be permitted to
challenge unlawful expenditures but noting that no such spending had been challenged in the
instant case); see also In re Biester, 409 A.2d 848, 852–53 (Pa. 1979) (holding that taxpayers
would have standing to challenge government conduct under certain conditions, but not in
the instant case). In addition, in Arneson v. Board of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement
System of Georgia, 361 S.E.2d 805 (Ga. 1987), the Georgia Supreme Court held that a state
taxpayer challenging an ultra vires act on the part of the state government will have standing
only if the act is, in fact, outside of the power of that agency or officer. See id. at 806–07.
Because the court essentially tied together the standing and merits determinations, it is hard
to classify the decision as a “standing” or “no standing” one.
210. For example, Texas courts generally have cited Terrell v. Middleton without
distinguishing between state and local taxpayers. See, e.g., Calvert v. Hull, 475 S.W.2d 907,
908 (Tex. 1972); City of Austin v. Thompson, 219 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex. 1949); Osborne v.
Keith, 177 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex. 1944); Hendee v. Dewhurst, 228 S.W.3d 354, 378 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2007); Tex. Indus. Traffic League v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 628 S.W.2d 187, 193
n.4 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); Lopez v. Ramirez, 558 S.W.2d 954, 958 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977);
First Nat’l Bank of Bellaire v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 551 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977); Anderson v. Houts, 240 S.W. 647, 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
211. See, e.g., Price v. Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet, 945 S.W.2d 429, 431–32 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1996) (discussing the evolution of Kentucky’s state taxpayer standing regime and
noting that it evolved largely from local taxpayer decisions); Regan v. Babcock, 247 N.W.
12, 16 (Minn. 1933) (permitting a state taxpayer lawsuit based solely on local taxpayer
action precedents).
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permissive jurisdiction; as discussed below, these initial decisions are the
most important, both for methodological and practical reasons. The
research in a particular state started with a Westlaw “natural language”
search for [taxpayer standing lawsuit action challenge illegal unlawful
expenditure]. That usually turned up several recent cases explaining the
current state taxpayer standing rules in a particular jurisdiction. The survey
traced back the cases cited in these recent decisions, and then the cases cited
in those, and so on, until it identified a manageable handful of the first
decisions establishing the current taxpayer standing rules. The survey then
searched the West headnote “States—Fiscal Management, Public Debt and
Securities—Rights and Remedies of Taxpayers” (360k168.5 k) in each state
to confirm that it had not missed the first progenitor decision or any other
important early cases. The survey also used a few law review surveys to
double-check its results.212 Finally, in a few states where this was
unproductive, it performed a text search for [taxpayer w/40 standing] to
verify that no cases existed.
Confirming that the first progenitor decisions in each state had been
identified generally was not difficult. The 1960 Yale survey cited most of
these cases, and the West headnote search uncovered most of the rest.
Many of the progenitor cases also acknowledged that they were resolving a
question of first impression.213 Once this first—and most important—
decision was found, locating its most immediate progeny was a
straightforward task. One difficult choice was where to draw the line in
terms of the number of subsequent cases to include; the survey did not
apply any hard-and-fast rule in this regard. The general goal was to collect
three decisions, but this was not always possible. There were only one or
two cases in some states, whereas in others, based on the development of
the caselaw, it seemed appropriate to include four or more. The judgment
required to determine how many cases to include for each state obviously
interjects the potential for bias; as such, this Article posits that the first
progenitor results are the most replicable and thus meaningful.214

212. See Chilakamarri, supra note 83, app. A at 271; Comment, Taxpayers’ Suits, supra
note 23, at 900 n.30; Parsons, supra note 39, at 963 n.87. These comments were all valuable
to varying degrees, though each had its drawbacks. The Yale survey was the most
comprehensive and accurate, but it is a half century old, so some of the state doctrines have
changed. Parson’s comment is also more than twenty-five years old, and it heavily borrows
from the Yale piece, so it shares many of the same problems. Finally, the Chilakamarri
comment, while more recent, commingles state and local taxpayer doctrines.
213. See, e.g., Nania v. Borges, 551 A.2d 781, 783 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1988) (observing
that the question of state taxpayer standing was one of first impression); Fergus v. Russel,
110 N.E. 130, 135–36 (Ill. 1915) (same); Wertz v. Shane, 249 N.W. 661, 662–63 (Iowa
1933) (same).
214. See, e.g., Joshua G. Urquhart, Younger Abstention and Its Aftermath: An Empirical
Perspective, 12 NEV. L.J. 1, 39–40 & nn.261–62 (2011) (discussing this possibility of
unintended bias). Essentially, the concern is that one might be tempted to include more
decisions from states that tend to support the Article’s main hypothesis. In this regard, in the
five states in which more than four cases were included, the twenty-seven included decisions
actually undercut the Article’s thesis. See infra Appendix (showing that in Alabama,
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The survey then determined whether each included decision involved a
state constitutional fiscal limitation. It used Professor Briffault’s definition
as a starting point to determine whether a constitutional provision was a
fiscal restriction, and then added in a few additional types of limitations that
fell within the basic spirit of Briffault’s premise, even if he did not identify
them by name.215 Several cases involved multiple claims, some of which
were state constitutional fiscal challenges and some of which were not; the
survey classified all such cases as involving state constitutional fiscal
limitations.
The survey also captured one final piece of information. In order to
control for the fact that there were different numbers of cases included for
various states, it placed each permissive jurisdiction into one of four
groups: (1) states in which constitutional fiscal limitations played an
exclusive role in the evolution of these doctrines (i.e., all early decisions
involved such challenges); (2) states in which constitutional fiscal
limitations played a substantial role in the evolution of these doctrines (i.e.,
half or more of the early decisions involved such challenges); (3) states in
which constitutional fiscal limitations played a modest role in the evolution
of these doctrines (i.e., a minority of the early decisions involved such
challenges); and (4) states in which constitutional fiscal limitations played
no role in the evolution of these doctrines (i.e., no early decisions involved
such challenges).
2. Results
Thirty-six states clearly permit state taxpayer lawsuits under their current
standing doctrines, as stated above. The survey included 122 published and
unpublished decisions from these jurisdictions, for an average of 3.4
decisions per state. A table listing the state-by-state results is included as
an appendix at the end of this Article.

Connecticut, Illinois, Oregon, and Washington, twelve of the decisions involved Briffaultian
limitation, thirteen did not, and two were unclear).
215. As discussed below, infra Part IV.B.2, government compensation limits were by far
the most commonly found of these “quasi-Briffaultian” provisions. See, e.g., Griffin v.
Rhoton, 107 S.W. 380 (Ark. 1907) (challenge to prosecutor salary in excess of constitutional
salary cap); Leckenby v. Post Printing & Publ’g Co., 176 P. 490 (Colo. 1918) (challenge to a
Lt. Governor’s expense appropriation on the grounds that it was an unconstitutional salary
increase); Arneson v. Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of Ga., 361 S.E.2d 805 (Ga. 1987)
(challenge to a government pension program on the grounds that it was unconstitutional
retroactive compensation). Single subject appropriation requirements are another common
fiscal limitation in the survey that was not explicitly identified by Briffault. See, e.g., Stewart
v. Stanley, 5 So. 2d 531 (La. 1941) (single subject appropriations challenge to crime
commission appropriation). In one state, two cases involved a provision implicating both
restrictions (i.e., a constitutional provision requiring that salary appropriations be confined to
a single subject). See Dep’t of Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1982); Dep’t of Admin.
v. Horne, 269 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1972).
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The number of cases in a particular state ranged from one (Maine216 and
Arizona217) to six (Alabama218 and Connecticut219). The included cases
spanned the time period from 1881220 to 2009.221 Looking at only the first
progenitor state taxpayer standing decision in a particular jurisdiction, those
cases ranged from 1881 to 1988.222 It was reasonably clear whether the
particular taxpayer challenge involved a state constitutional fiscal limitation
in 119 of the survey decisions; in contrast, three cases were so vague in
their description of the plaintiffs’ claims that the type of challenge being
brought is unknowable.223 This latter group includes one first progenitor
case.224
With respect to the most meaningful group of decisions—the first
progenitor cases—twenty-five of the thirty-five ascertainable decisions
(71.4%) involved state constitutional fiscal challenges. Of the ten first
progenitor cases that did not involve any Briffaultian fiscal limitations, six
(17.1%) involved statutory or other nonconstitutional claims and four
(11.4%) involved state constitutional challenges that were not fiscal in
nature.
The aggregate survey results are consistent with this topline finding.
With respect to the state-by-state categorization metric, which attempts to
control for the fact that the survey includes different numbers of cases for
various jurisdictions, state constitutional fiscal limitations played an
exclusive role in the creation and development of permissive state taxpayer
216. See Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1 (Me. 1983). A more recent Maine decision
addressed the issue of the standing of state sales taxpayers to bring a taxpayer action, but it
rejected standing. See Collins v. State, 750 A.2d 1257 (Me. 2000).
217. See Ethington v. Wright, 189 P.2d 209 (Ariz. 1948). A more recent Arizona
decision addressed the issue of state taxpayer standing, but it ultimately rejected standing
because the plaintiffs were not alleging the unconstitutional or illegal expenditure of
taxpayer moneys. See Bennett v. Napolitano, 81 P.3d 311, 318 (Ariz. 2003).
218. See Zeigler v. Baker, 344 So. 2d 761 (Ala. 1977); Goode v. Tyler, 186 So. 129 (Ala.
1939); Leedy v. Taylor, 164 So. 820 (Ala. 1935); Abramson v. Hard, 155 So. 590 (Ala.
1934); Hall v. Blan, 148 So. 601 (Ala. 1933); Turnipseed v. Blan, 148 So. 116 (Ala. 1933).
219. See Bingham v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 16 A.3d 865 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2009); Conn.
Post LP v. State Traffic Comm’n, No. X01CV990160337S, 2000 WL 33983848 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sep. 22, 2000); Enama v. Weicker, No. CV94-0046563S, 1994 WL 282165
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 13, 1994); Henry v. Life Haven, No. 329566, 1992 WL 170652
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 9, 1992); Stanley Works v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, No. 393661, 1991
WL 204897 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sep. 27, 1991); Nania v. Borges, 551 A.2d 781 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1988).
220. See Lynn v. Polk, 76 Tenn. 121 (1881). The Lynn case was a chronological outlier.
The next earliest decisions were a trio of 1907 cases. See Griffin, 107 S.W. 380; Schley v.
Lee, 67 A. 252 (Md. 1907); Christmas v. Warfield, 66 A. 491 (Md. 1907).
221. See Bingham, 16 A.3d 865.
222. The latest first state taxpayer standing decision was Nania, 551 A.2d 781.
223. See Leedy, 164 So. 820; Richardson v. Blackburn, 187 A.2d 823 (Del. Ch. 1963);
Reiter v. Wallgren, 184 P.2d 571 (Wash. 1947). There also were a few additional cases in
which the type of state constitutional challenge was not explicitly identified, but based on the
context, it must have been a fiscal one. See, e.g., Richards v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 67
N.E.2d 583 (Mass. 1946); Leichter v. Barber, 451 N.Y.S.2d 899 (App. Div. 1982); Lynn, 76
Tenn. 121 (1881).
224. See Reiter, 184 P.2d 571.
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doctrines in eight jurisdictions (22.2%); a substantial role in fourteen
jurisdictions (38.9%); a modest role in nine jurisdictions (25.0%); and no
role in the remaining five jurisdictions (13.9%). In other words, state
constitutional fiscal limitations played an exclusive or substantial role in the
early state taxpayer standing decisions in more than three-fifths—twentytwo of thirty-six (61.1%)—of the permissive state taxpayer standing
jurisdictions.225 With respect to the less meaningful unweighted aggregate
survey results, slightly more than half of the total number of cases included
in the survey—64 of the 119 ascertainable decisions (53.8%)—involved
Briffaultian fiscal challenges.
The cases not involving state constitutional fiscal challenges were
roughly split evenly between nonfiscal state constitutional challenges and
nonconstitutional claims. Thirty of the ascertainable non-Briffaultian cases
(25.0%) consisted of statutory, ultra vires or other nonconstitutional
challenges. Twenty-five of these ascertainable cases (20.8%) involved state
constitutional claims, but the claims did not implicate any fiscal limitations.
Finally, two very specific types of state constitutional fiscal limitations
seemed to play an especially important role in the creation and development
of state taxpayer standing doctrines in many of the permissive jurisdictions.
Seventeen decisions involved constitutional challenges based on
government salary or compensation limits. This is 14.3 percent of all
ascertainable survey decisions, and more than a quarter (26.6%) of the
survey cases involving state constitutional fiscal limitations. It is an
understatement to say that state courts seem quite willing to permit state
taxpayer lawsuits challenging executive or legislative official salaries or
other government compensation on the grounds that they violate a specific
state constitutional restriction, at least in the early taxpayer standing cases
included in the survey.
It was also fairly common for a court to allow a state taxpayer to
challenge a government expenditure on the grounds that it violated the
jurisdiction’s single-subject appropriation restriction.
This type of
constitutional provision generally requires that any legislative appropriation
be limited to a single subject, ostensibly to combat various forms of
legislative misconduct (e.g., attaching unpopular substantive measures to a
“must pass” budget bill).226 Six decisions included in the survey involved
such single subject appropriation restrictions.227 Therefore, more than a
third of the included state constitutional fiscal decisions (twenty-three out

225. Twenty-two of these twenty-three states include a first-progenitor decision involving
Briffaultian limitations; the remaining one was unclear. Id.
226. See generally Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process,
67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 803 (2006) (discussing single subject appropriation rules); see also
Ondrea D. Riley, Comment, Annual Federal Deficit Spending: Sending the Judiciary to the
Rescue, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 591–92 (1994).
227. This is 5.0 percent of all ascertainable survey cases, and 9.2 percent of those that
involve state constitutional fiscal limitations.
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of sixty-four) involved either government compensation or single subject
appropriation restrictions.228
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SURVEY RESULTS
The final part of this Article discusses the implications of the survey
results. It begins by discussing the degree to which the survey affirms or
disaffirms the Article’s hypothesis. It then concludes by considering
additional implications of the empirical results and suggesting avenues for
future research.
A. The Hypothesis Confirmed . . .
The most important conclusion to be gleaned from these survey results is
that this Article’s hypothesized link between permissive state taxpayer
standing doctrines and state constitutional fiscal limitations appears to exist
in practice, at least to some degree. Twenty-five of thirty-five (71.4%) of
the ascertainable first progenitor cases involved these Briffaultian
challenges.229 This is highly suggestive of a connection between the two
doctrines. There is a wide universe of statutory and constitutional claims
that could be brought under the guise of a state taxpayer lawsuit in state
court; indeed, one can find many of them in the decisions included in the
survey.230 It is difficult to believe that the narrow category of state
constitutional fiscal restrictions would come up over and over again in the
first progenitor decisions in so many states absent some connection between
the two concepts.
And again, this first progenitor result is almost certainly the most
meaningful metric. First, from a methodological standpoint, using only the
first permissive taxpayer standing case avoids the exercise of judgment in
determining how many cases to include for each state, which eliminates
bias and weighting concerns.231 Second, and more conceptually, it is
entirely predictable that a later state court might latch on to the earlier
taxpayer standing precedent devised from a progenitor case involving
Briffaultian limitations, even when the claims before it do not implicate that
sort of fiscal challenge. Indeed, this precise scenario—a first progenitor
case involving a state constitutional fiscal challenge that is followed by
228. As mentioned above, two Florida decisions involved a single subject appropriation
requirement specifically applicable to government official salary appropriations. See supra
note 215. Although this requirement arguably could be classified as either type of
restriction, the survey placed it in the government compensation limitation category.
229. See supra Part IV.B.2.
230. See, e.g., Green v. Jones, 261 S.W. 43 (Ark. 1924) (statutory challenge to a convict
lease-out arrangement); Ahlgren v. Carr, 25 Cal. Rptr. 887 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963)
(statutory challenge to textbook purchase); Nania v. Borges, 551 A.2d 781 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1988) (statutory challenge based on the failure to observe a budgetary reserve requirement);
Light & Power Constr. Co. v. McConnell, 181 A.2d 86 (Del. Ch. 1962) (statutory challenge
to a bidding contract); Masson v. Reindollar, 69 A.2d 482 (Md. 1949) (ultra vires challenge
to a road contract).
231. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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subsequent cases not involving those claims—occurred in the included
survey decisions in six jurisdictions (i.e., nearly a quarter of the states with
a first progenitor decision involving state constitutional fiscal claims).232
The robustness of this conclusion is underscored when one looks at the
aggregate results encompassing all survey cases. Using the state-by-state
categories defined above, state constitutional fiscal challenges were an
exclusive or substantial driving force behind the particular permissive
taxpayer standing doctrine in nearly two-thirds (61.1%) of the relevant
jurisdictions.233 Looking at the (less meaningful) unweighted aggregate
results, more than half (53.8%) of all decisions included in the survey
where the type of challenge being brought is ascertainable involve
Briffaultian fiscal limitations.234 This should all lead to one inescapable
conclusion—there is a distinct and unmistakable connection between state
constitutional fiscal limitations and permissive state taxpayer standing
doctrines, at least in the early state taxpayer standing decisions.
A second important observation is that the survey results undercut any
theory broadly linking permissive state taxpayer standing doctrines and
nonfiscal substantive social and economic constitutional regulatory
provisions, specifically including positive rights and regulatory norms.235
Relatively few cases in the survey even involved any type of nonfiscal state
constitutional claims.236 And even among those challenges, very few (if
any) involve substantive policy provisions or positive rights.237 Therefore,
insofar as this Article rejects the premise that permissive state taxpayer
standing doctrines are linked to the broader universe of non-Briffaultian
substantive economic and social constitutional regulatory provisions, then
the survey results are consistent with that position.

232. Texas is a prime example of this phenomenon. After the initial decision in Terrell v.
Middleton, 187 S.W. 367, 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), the subsequent Texas state taxpayer
standing cases generally do not involve state constitutional fiscal challenges. See, e.g.,
Calvert v. Hull, 475 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1972); Johnson v. Ferguson, 55 S.W.2d 153, 158
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Sherman v. Cage, 279 S.W. 508, 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). Other
states in which this pattern occurred include Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and Utah.
233. See supra Part IV.B.2.
234. See supra Part IV.B.2.
235. See supra Part III.B (critiquing this theory).
236. In fact, non-Briffaultian constitutional claims are implicated in a minority—twentyfive of fifty-five—of all remaining survey decisions. See supra Part IV.B.2; infra Appendix.
Of course, given that this Article was examining taxpayer lawsuits, the fact that there were
very few nonfiscal constitutional challenges probably should not be surprising.
237. For example, several of the state constitutional claims in the survey cases involved
separation of powers issues. See, e.g., Ethington v. Wright, 189 P.2d 209 (Ariz. 1948)
(challenge to improper legislative delegation of nonprofit property appraisal duties);
Greenfield v. Russel, 127 N.E. 102 (Ill. 1920) (challenge to a legislative investigation on
separation of powers grounds); Okla. Pub. Emps. Ass’n v. Okla. Dep’t of Cent. Servs., 55
P.3d 1072 (Okla. 2002) (challenge to a delegation of mental health institution management
duties in violation of the state constitution).
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B. . . . but Only to Some Degree
And yet, it is important not to overstate these conclusions for two
reasons. First, the survey findings were far from universal. The link
between state constitutional fiscal limitations and permissive state taxpayer
standing doctrines may be reasonably strong, but it is not uniform by any
stretch. A significant minority of survey cases did not involve any state
constitutional fiscal claims.238
This includes five states—Arizona,
California, Delaware, Minnesota, and New Jersey—in which none of the
survey cases involved a state constitutional fiscal challenge.239 Moreover,
roughly a quarter of the survey decisions (counting all included decisions
from Delaware and New Jersey), and six of the thirty-five ascertainable first
progenitor decisions, encompass only statutory or other nonconstitutional
challenges.
So just as commentators are inaccurate when they say that “virtually all”
states permit state taxpayer lawsuits,240 the hard-to-deny connection
between Briffaultian constitutional fiscal limitations and permissive state
taxpayer standing doctrines can be mischaracterized as stronger than it
really is. Part of the explanation for this may be the possibility, as
discussed above, that some state courts may have extended existing
permissive taxpayer standing rules developed from earlier state
constitutional fiscal challenges to broader types of lawsuits in later cases.241
Yet even this is largely inconsistent with the fact that the first progenitor
decisions in ten jurisdictions do not involve any state constitutional fiscal
claims.242 These nonfiscal progenitor cases show that permissive state
taxpayer standing doctrines arise outside the state constitutional fiscal
challenge context in a sizeable minority of jurisdictions. There must be
something else to help explain this federal-state taxpayer standing disparity,
at least in part.
One tempting response is to simply wave away the federal taxpayer
standing regime as a unique outlier. This argument views liberal taxpayer
238. Specifically, 28.6 percent of ascertainable first progenitor decisions and 46.2 percent
of all such survey decisions involved exclusively non-Briffaultian claims. See supra Part
IV.B.2.
239. See Ethington, 189 P.2d 209; Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1976); Serrano v.
Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Cal. State Emps. Ass’n v. Williams, 86 Cal. Rptr. 305
(Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Ahlgren v. Carr, 25 Cal. Rptr. 887 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Kuhn
Constr. Co. v. State, 366 A.2d 1209 (Del. Ch. 1976); Koffler v. McBride, 283 A.2d 855
(Del. Ch. 1971); Richardson v. Blackburn, 187 A.2d 823 (Del. Ch. 1963); Light & Power
Constr. Co. v. McConnell, 181 A.2d 86 (Del. Ch. 1962); McKee v. Likins, 261 N.W.2d 566
(Minn. 1977); Rockne v. Olson, 254 N.W. 5 (Minn. 1934); Regan v. Babcock, 247 N.W. 12
(Minn. 1933); Yacenda Food Mgmt. Corp. v. N.J. Highway Auth., 496 A.2d 733 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Warnock Ryan Leasing, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of
Purchase and Prop., 475 A.2d 1270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984); Essex Cnty. Welfare
Bd. v. Dep’t of Insts. and Agencies, 371 A.2d 771 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
240. See supra Part II.B (noting that at least eight states do not permit state taxpayer
lawsuits).
241. See supra note 232.
242. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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standing rules as the default stance for any jurisdiction (state or federal),
regardless of the claim at issue. The only important question in evaluating
the federal-state disparity, then, is why the federal anti–taxpayer standing
doctrine is so different from the mainstream position exemplified by the
majority of states—not why the states themselves are so permissive. But
this argument is undercut by the eight states that preclude state taxpayer
actions and perhaps even the six additional jurisdictions in which the state
taxpayer standing rules are ultimately unclear.243 The restrictiveness of the
federal taxpayer standing regime may place it alongside a minority of states,
but that minority does exist. Put simply, the federal standard is not nearly
as unique or sui generis as some commentators characterize it. This
complex and multifaceted issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
A more fundamental reason why the survey results should be taken with
a grain of salt, at least with respect to confirming this Article’s hypothesis,
is that the issue of state taxpayer standing could be disproportionately likely
to implicate state constitutional fiscal limitations by its very nature. In
other words, there may be a distinct correlation between the presence of
Briffaultian restrictions in state constitutions and permissive state taxpayer
standing rules in those same states, but that does not necessarily imply
causation.244
The obvious mechanism for this correlation is straightforward. Most
states require a nexus between a taxpayer-plaintiff and the action being
challenged.245 This normally means that the plaintiff must be challenging
an expenditure from a fund into which he or she paid taxes, or at the very
least, conduct that has the potential to diminish the money held in that
fund.246 As a result, taxpayer challenges seem largely predestined to
involve fiscal challenges and, even more specifically, claims that a
government expenditure or equivalent fiscal conduct violated a specific
limitation. Statutory fiscal restrictions can be changed by the legislature
that authorized the expenditure in question, so they should not play much of
a role in these lawsuits. That leaves constitutional fiscal restrictions as the
most logical culprit to be implicated by the claims usually asserted in state
taxpayer lawsuits.
This Article’s hypothesis, therefore, may have the relationship backward.
Permissive state taxpayer standing doctrines did not evolve because of the
widespread existence of Briffaultian fiscal limitations; instead, the technical
requirements applied to most state taxpayer lawsuits essentially act as a
justiciability filter that disproportionately allows through only those claims
implicating state constitutional fiscal challenges. But if that is “all” this
243. See supra Part II.B (discussing jurisdictions that do not permit state taxpayer
lawsuits).
244. See, e.g., Urquhart, supra note 214, at 49–50 & n.304 (citing authorities
distinguishing between correlation and causation).
245. See supra Part II.C (discussing the required nexus between the challenged
expenditure and the plaintiff’s taxes).
246. See supra Part II.C.
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Article shows—that state taxpayer standing requirements tend to act to
restrict such lawsuits to state constitutional fiscal claims—then that seems
like a noteworthy conclusion in and of itself.247 In any event, the issue of
causality is an interesting one that is worthy of future inquiry.
C. The Importance of the Prevalence of State
Constitutional Fiscal Limitations
There is another important point to make about the apparent relationship
between state constitutional fiscal limitations and permissive state taxpayer
standing doctrines. It ultimately is unlikely that these spending restrictions,
viewed singularly in isolation, are solely responsible for the creation and
development of the relevant taxpayer standing rules. State constitutions
undeniably are much more concerned than their federal counterpart with
limiting the federal government’s discretion over fiscal matters. But
commentators can exaggerate the purported dearth of such fiscal limitations
in the U.S. Constitution.248 There certainly are much fewer of these
Briffaultian restrictions in the federal constitution, but they are not totally
absent. The Establishment Clause is only one.249
The Twenty-Seventh Amendment, for example, requires that any change
in congressional salaries can only take effect after the next biennial
election.250 The provision should call to mind the state constitutional
compensation limits that play a central role in the early state taxpayer
standing cases in so many jurisdictions.251 Furthermore, the army
appropriations clause in Article I, Section 8 expressly prevents Congress
from appropriating army-related funds for a time period longer than two
years—clearly another type of specific and direct spending limitation.252
Both of these provisions provide narrow and concrete restrictions on the
fiscal conduct of the government in a way that is similar to the state
constitutional fiscal limitations central to this Article’s thesis. But despite
their Briffaultian nature, the Supreme Court has never interpreted either of
these provisions to convey standing to a taxpayer challenging a purportedly
illegal federal government expenditure.253
247. I am grateful to Professor William Hubbard for putting this point so eloquently in
our correspondence.
248. See supra note 177 (cataloguing commentators who assert that the U.S. Constitution
generally does not restrict fiscal conduct).
249. See supra Part I.A (discussing the Flast retrenchment).
250. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII.
251. See supra Part IV.B.2 (noting that government compensation limits and single
subject appropriation requirements are implicated in a disproportionate number of cases).
252. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
253. Notwithstanding this silence, a few lower courts have passed on both of these
questions. Early decisions generally permit taxpayer standing to challenge an appropriation
purportedly violating U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. See, e.g., W. Mining Council v. Watt,
643 F.2d 618, 630–33 (9th Cir. 1981) (allowing taxpayer challenge based on army
appropriations clause); Katcoff v. Marsh, 582 F. Supp. 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), modified, 755
F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985) (same); see also 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 24,
§ 3531.10.1 (noting that Western Mining Council granted taxpayer standing to bring an army

2012]

DISFAVORED CONSTITUTION, PASSIVE VIRTUES?

1309

That observation admittedly undercuts this Article’s hypothesis, at least
to some degree. If constitutional fiscal restrictions necessarily or inevitably
result in the creation of permissive state taxpayer standing doctrines so as to
avoid their otherwise unenforceability, then one would expect to see a welldeveloped line of federal cases permitting taxpayer challenges to
expenditures that arguably violate one of these provisions. This is
especially true in light of Flast’s Establishment Clause holding. The Court
obviously knows how to create exceptions to the general federal anti–
taxpayer standing rule when confronted with a specific and direct spending
restriction.254 And yet it has not with respect to these two similarlypurposed constitutional fiscal limitations. So why are state constitutional
fiscal restrictions so prone to lead to permissive taxpayer standing rules, but
their federal equivalents are not?
The first obvious answer is that just as state courts often devise
permissive state taxpayer standing rules from cases involving constitutional
fiscal limitations and then extend them outside of that context,255 federal
courts may have created the federal anti–taxpayer standing doctrine from
disputes unrelated to any constitutional spending limits and then
subsequently applied that principle in cases involving such fiscal
restrictions. In other words, the default rules at both the federal and state
levels control, even under circumstances that are quite different from those
that led to their creation in the first place. But this observation merely
raises two interrelated questions. What is the ultimate origin of these
default rules? And why are they adhered to so strongly, even when the case
at hand does not implicate the same concerns on which they were based?
These more subtle and far-reaching questions are probably best answered
by Professor Briffault’s insight about fiscal restrictions and the fundamental
nature of state constitutionalism. State constitutions are not merely
subordinate versions of the federal constitution with lots of quirky ad hoc
fiscal limitations thrown in. To the contrary, Briffault argues, ubiquitous
fiscal restrictions make state constitutions an intrinsically different creature
from their federal counterpart. Their prevalence, specificity, and unique
focus on protecting taxpayers from improper fiscal conduct fundamentally
define state constitutionalism in a way that is distinct from the U.S.
Constitution.256

appropriations clause challenge). All of these decisions predate the Court’s more recent
efforts to narrow Flast, so it is questionable whether courts would reach the same result
today. With respect to the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, lower courts have unanimously
rejected claims of taxpayer standing. See, e.g., Schaffer v. Clinton, 240 F.3d 878, 881 (10th
Cir. 2001). Individual congressmen may have nontaxpayer standing where a salary change
actually affects them, however. See Boehner v. Anderson, 30 F.3d 156, 160–61 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
254. See supra Parts I.A, IV.A (discussing Flast rationale).
255. See supra Part V.B & note 232 (discussing the states that fit this pattern).
256. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 31, at 909 (“Fiscal limits, as well as positive rights,
thus characterize state constitutional law.”); see also Williams, supra note 192, at 905.
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Therein lies one plausible explanation. A court can ignore an uncommon
or one-off constitutional fiscal protection as a “political question” or
similarly nonjusticiable issue with little or no long-term institutional
consequences.257 The plaintiff invoking this provision will be disappointed,
to be sure, but as long as the scenario does not seem likely to repeat itself
over and over again, the isolated unenforceability of the specific fiscal
restriction will be tolerable. Things change when a constitution is riddled
with so many of these limitations that they assume the identity of a distinct
and identifiable constitutional thread. It then is much more difficult for a
court to refuse to enforce the restrictions for a lack of standing. That court
faces a troublesome choice. It must choose whether to (1) allow the
plaintiffs to proceed despite the lack of traditional injury-based standing,
(2) distinguish the constitutional fiscal limitation in question from the
similar provisions that are interspersed throughout the constitution, or
(3) ignore a pervasive constitutional theme.
This may be the reason that the isolated fiscal limitations in the U.S.
Constitution have not led to the same widespread embrace of taxpayer
lawsuits that has occurred at the state level. There just are not enough of
them. Federal courts generally decline to consider challenges predicated on
(for example) the Twenty-Seventh Amendment on standing grounds
because doing so has so few ramifications on any other types of substantive
federal constitutional provisions or overarching themes (e.g., separation of
powers, federalism, due process).258 State courts, in contrast, refuse to
ignore the myriad of Briffaultian fiscal restrictions that are interspersed
throughout state constitutions because that would be a much more difficult
and consequential task. These courts essentially would be deleting an
omnipresent and crucial thread of state constitutionalism, which they
understandably are reluctant to do. Constitutional fiscal limitations
therefore might only drive the creation of permissive taxpayer standing
doctrines once they reach a critical mass. Before that, and they can be
“written out” of a constitution with little long term institutional cost to the
courts; after, and they cannot be ignored.
D. Permissive Taxpayer Standing Rules: An Exception to Briffault’s
“Disfavored Constitution”?
There is one final point to make. Professor Briffault’s “disfavored
constitution” may be a plausible explanation for the federal-state taxpayer
standing disparity, but that does not mean it is fully consistent with this
Article’s thesis. Indeed, the idea that constitutional fiscal limitations are a
major impetus for the creation and development of permissive state
257. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 152–53 (6th ed. 2012)
(noting that the federal standards for determining what is or is not a nonjusticiable political
question are largely ad hoc and “useless”); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the
“Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1045 (1985); Louis Michael Seidman, The
Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 441, 442–43 (2003).
258. See Schaffer, 240 F.3d at 881.
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taxpayer standing rules actually undercuts Briffault’s argument in one
important way.
This inconsistency traces to one of the dual meanings in the term
“disfavored constitution.” As explained above, Briffault used it as
shorthand for the general inclination of many courts to minimize or even
disregard state constitutional fiscal restrictions.259 This judicial hostility to
Briffaultian limitations in one sense conflicts with this Article’s argument
that state courts generally permit taxpayers to challenge violations of those
provisions, even when traditional standing rules would preclude the claim.
If fiscal limitations are such a fundamental thread of state constitutionalism
that they compel courts to relax traditional injury-based standing rules, then
why do these same state courts give the restrictions short shrift on the
merits?
This seeming contradiction is only underscored by the suspicion that
dismissing a lawsuit on justiciability grounds is an easy way to avoid
reaching the merits of a difficult and disfavored constitutional fiscal
challenge while still resolving the case.260 A judge need not undertake the
often controversial and complicated task of slapping down a putative—and
largely victimless—economic overreach by the legislative or executive
branches if he or she simply can reject a lawsuit on standing grounds
because it is brought by an undifferentiated taxpayer.261 Yet courts seem
especially unlikely to rely on injury-based standing limits in that scenario if
this Article’s thesis is correct.
Perhaps the best thing to say about this apparent inconsistency is that one
should not make too much of it. This Article did not attempt to determine
whether the taxpayer-plaintiff ultimately was successful in the included
permissive taxpayer standing cases involving constitutional fiscal
limitations. It is entirely possible that courts interpreted the provisions at
issue narrowly on their merits in those cases, which would be consistent
with Briffault’s “disfavored constitution.”
Furthermore, Briffault’s
argument that courts tend to minimize or ignore constitutional fiscal
limitations on their merits does not purport to be an empirical one. It is
conceivable that a more rigorous inquiry (if one could be devised) might
disprove or qualify his thesis.
259. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 909–10, 939–44 (discussing the reluctance of state
courts to enforce constitutional fiscal limits); see also supra note 194 and accompanying text
(cataloguing additional commentary noting this reluctance).
260. This suspicion is shared by courts and commentators alike. See, e.g., Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 18 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The
Court today erects a novel prudential standing principle in order to avoid reaching the merits
of the constitutional claim.”); Winter, supra note 47, at 1373 (“[T]he doctrine of standing is
either a judicial mask for the exercise of prudence to avoid decisionmaking or a sophisticated
manipulation for the sub rosa decision of cases on their merits.”).
261. For example, resolving a constitutional fiscal challenge can require the court to
weigh and reconcile competing fiscal and nonfiscal constitutional provisions. See, e.g.,
Guinn v. Legislature of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003) (balancing educational funding and
tax-increase voting requirements); see also Briffault, supra note 31, at 951–52 (discussing
Guinn).
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More substantively, there is a general temporal difference between the
cases included in the survey, which largely date to the first half of the
twentieth century, and the authorities relied on by Briffault, which are of
Briffault’s “disfavored constitution”
much more recent vintage.262
therefore might be a much more recent phenomenon that largely postdates
the earlier emergence of permissive taxpayer standing rules.263
And finally, there is a mundane explanation for any seeming
contradiction. Two types of fiscal limitations involved in many of the
survey cases—government compensation and single subject appropriation
limits—were not specifically addressed by Briffault.264 State court hostility
to Briffaultian limitations might not extend to those specific types of
provisions.265 Perhaps they are not subject to a more narrow construction
as are many of the restrictions explicitly identified by Briffault. In any
event, more work must be done in this regard.
CONCLUSION
This Article’s fundamental thesis is quite simple: Most states permit
taxpayer lawsuits because their state constitutions are littered with—and to
some degree, defined by—a myriad of constitutional fiscal restrictions that
would be unenforceable unless the intended taxpayer-beneficiaries266 could
sue to invoke them. So state courts allow state taxpayer actions in order to
give meaning to this important thread of state constitutionalism. This is a
novel theory. A number of scholars have examined the issue of permissive
state taxpayer standing doctrines over the past half century,267 but no one
has proposed a link between liberal state taxpayer standing rules and
constitutional fiscal limitations. And yet, a simple empirical-historical
survey of early state taxpayer standing decisions in all permissive
jurisdictions suggests that there is some degree of truth to it.
But it is important to emphasize that—as is so often the case with issues
of state law—there is substantial variance among the jurisdictions, and it
would be wrong to view the creation and development of state taxpayer
standing doctrines as a monolithic or homogenous process. It is hard to
dispute the connection between state constitutional fiscal limitations and
liberal state taxpayer standing doctrines, but the link is by no means
uniform or universal. That suggests that this Article’s argument—while
certainly novel—is at best incomplete, and more research is necessary to
understand the ultimate impetus behind permissive state taxpayer standing
262. See supra Part IV.B.2 (summarizing the dates of the included cases).
263. I am grateful to Professor Briffault for suggesting this theory to me in our
correspondence. Professors Hershkoff and Hubbard concurred with his observation.
264. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the prevalence of these two provisions in the
survey cases).
265. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 910–18.
266. See supra Part III.C (discussing the purpose behind state constitutional fiscal
limitations).
267. See supra Parts II.A, III.A (discussing views on permissive state taxpayer standing
doctrines).
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regimes. That work remains for a future project. This Article only aspires
to introduce a new and potentially promising theory into the academic
discourse. Hopefully it has succeeded.
APPENDIX
State
AL
AZ
AK
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA

No.
6
1
3
4
4
3
6
4
4
3

PC
Y
Nc
Y
Y
Ns
Y
Ns
Ns
Y
Y

CFL
4
1
2
2
0
2
0
1
2
2

NF
0
0
1
1
2
1
0
0
2
1

NC
1
0
0
1
2
0
6
2
0
0

Uncl.
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0

GC
2
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
2
1

5

Y

2

3

0

0

4

Y

2

1

1

3
3
1
4
3

Y
Y
Y
Nc
Y

3
2
1
1
3

0
1
0
2
0

3
2
3
4
3

Ns
Y
Y
Y
Y

0
2
1
3
3

3

Ns

3
3
2
3
5
3

SS

Cat.
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0

S
N
S
S
N
S
N
M
M
S

2

0

M

0

1

0

S

0
0
0
1
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
1
0
0
0

E
S
E
M
E

1
0
0
1
0

2
0
2
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
1

N
E
M
S
E

0

0

3

0

0

0

N

Y
Ns
Y

3
1
2

0
0
0

0
2
0

0
0
0

1
0
0

0
1
0

E
M
E

Y
Y
Nc

2
4
1

1
0
2

0
1
0

0
0
0

0
2
1

0
0
0

S
S
M
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RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
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4
2
4
3

Y
Y
Y
Nc

3
1
1
1

1
0
0
1

0
1
3
1

0
0
0
0

0
0
1
0

0
0
0
0

S
S
M
M

5
3
3

U
Y
Y

2
2
3

1
1
0

1
0
0

1
0
0

0
1
1

0
0
0

S
S
E

8E
14S
Total
122
64 25
30
3
17
6
9M
5N
Legend: PC: First progenitor case involves constitutional fiscal
limitations; CFL: Cases involving state constitutional fiscal limitations;
NF: Cases involving nonfiscal constitutional challenges; NC: Cases
involving nonconstitutional challenges; Uncl.: Cases with unknown an
challenge; GC: Cases involving government compensation challenges; SS:
Cases involving single subject appropriation challenges; Cat.: Category;
Nc: First progenitor case involves nonfiscal constitutional challenge; Ns:
First progenitor case involves nonconstitutional challenge; U: First
progenitor case involves unknown challenge; E: All cases involve state
constitutional fiscal challenges; S: Majority of cases involve state
constitutional fiscal challenges; M: Minority of cases involve state
constitutional fiscal challenges; Y: Yes; N: No cases involve state
constitutional fiscal challenges.
25Y
10N
1U

